The interorganizational cooperation and conflict among agricultural support organizations in Khon Kaen province, Thailand by Chamruspanth, Viyouth
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1987
The interorganizational cooperation and conflict
among agricultural support organizations in Khon
Kaen province, Thailand
Viyouth Chamruspanth
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Rural Sociology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chamruspanth, Viyouth, "The interorganizational cooperation and conflict among agricultural support organizations in Khon Kaen
province, Thailand " (1987). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 8517.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8517
INFORMATION TO USERS 
While the most advanced technology has been used to 
photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of 
the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of 
the material submitted. For example: 
• Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such 
cases, the best available copy has been filmed. 
• Manuscripts may not always be complete. In such 
cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to 
obtain missing pages. 
• Copyrighted material may have been removed from 
the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the 
deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are 
photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is 
also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an 
additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or as a 17"x 23" 
black and white photographic print. 
Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive 
microfilm or microfiche but lack the clarity on xerographic 
copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, 
35mm slides of 6"x 9" black and white photographic prints 
are available for any photographs or illustrations that 
cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography. 

8716747 
Chamruspanth, Viyouth 
THE INTERORGANiZATIONAL COOPERATION AND CONFLICT AMONG 
AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN KHON KAEN PROVINCE, 
THAILAND 
Iowa Slate University PH.D. 1987 
University 
Microfilms 
Iniernstionsl 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 

The interorganizational cooperation and conflict 
among agricultural support organizations in 
Khon Kaen province, Thailand 
by 
Viyouth Chamruspanth 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Department: Sociology and Anthropology 
Major; Rural Sociology 
Approved ; 
In Charge of Major Work 
For the Major Department 
For the Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1987 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
DEDICATION iv 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Agricultural Development 1 
Objectives of the Study 9 
Significance of the Study 9 
Roles of Agricultural Support Organizations in 10 
Khan Kaen Province, Thailand 
Organization of the Dissertation 18 
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 20 
CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY 59 
Samples 59 
General Characteristics of the Samples 61 
Data Collection 59 
Measurement of Major Concepts 70 
Data Analysis 76 
CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 84 
A Description of the Interorganizational Relations 84 
Among Agricultural Support Organizations at the 
Provincial and Local Levels 
Hypothesis Testing and Model Evaluation 101 
Simple Bivariate Analysis 101 
Interorganizational Relation Between 106 
Organizations at the Provincial Level and the 
Local Level (Group 1) 
The Evaluation of the Model for Group 1 117 
Interorganizational Relationships Among Agricultural 123 
Support Organizations at the Local Level (Group 2) 
The Evaluation of the Model for Group 2 130 
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 137 
Implications for Further Research 148 
Implications for Policy Formulation 154 
REFERENCES 158 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 172 
APPENDIX 1. LIST OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 174 
Organizations at the Provincial Level 175 
Organizations at the District Level 175 
APPENDIX 2. QUESTIONNAIRE 179 
Survey of Agricultural Support Organizations at 180 
Khon Kaen, Thailand 
APPENDIX 3. COVARIANCE MATRICES 198 
APPENDIX 4. CORRELATION MATRICES 201 
iv 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved parents? 
Prayat and Boonnum Chamruspanth, whose support and sacrifice 
made my educational success possible. I also dedicate it to 
Euamporn, my lovely wife, and to ray little daughters, Pimporn 
and Nunyupa in appreciation of their encoucag^-aen!: and 
psychological support during three and a half years of 
separation. 
1 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural Development 
Agricultural development efforts have been at the heart of 
planning in most developing countries. The te on 'devcslup'ient' 
connotes a positive direction of change, i.e., a change for 
the better. Generally, agricultural development refers to an 
increase in total agricultural output and an improvement in 
the efficiency of production, that is, realizing greater 
outputs per unit of input (Leistritz et al., 1986). 
Agricultural development may also involve the substitution of 
capital for labor so that producers can increase the 
efficiency of their operations by increasing the level of 
output produced by a constant or declining labor pool 
(Tweeten, 1979). This, in fact, is one alternative way of 
viewing agricultural development. 
In some developing countries.- agricultural development may 
involve the redistribution of the means of production — land, 
labor, and capital (Todaro, 1985). Land redistribution, 
usually known as land reform, is the major task for countries 
that adopt this model of rural development. 
Regardless of the specific strategy used to achieve 
agricultural development goals, all developing countries share 
this common objective. The main purpose of agricultural 
development might be to increase food production to a level of 
national self sufficiency which will also result in a 
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qualitative improvement in the nutritional levels. A second 
objective might be the improvement of farmers' incomes which 
is a direct result of the increase realized in food 
production. Farmers, by producing more than they need for 
their own consumption, can sell the agricultural surplus in 
the market for cash. This depends very much on the 
development of a full market economy. In addition, 
agricultural development activities may aim at the growth and 
diversification of employment in either the wage sector or the 
self-employed farming sector (Hunter, 1974). The increase in 
the employment rate in the agricultural sector certainly leads 
to a rise in the purchasing power and the general well-being 
of the rural sector. 
Several alternatives of agricultural development 
strategies have been developed and applied in several 
developing countries all over the world. According to 
Thorbecke (1979), agricultural development strategies can be 
distinguished into four types: 
(1) A unimodal (or progressive-modernization) strategy 
(2) A bimodal (or dualistic) strategy 
(3) An industrialization-first strategy 
(4) A collectivization strategy. 
The unimodal strategy, sometimes referred to as the 
"Japanese model" (Johnston, 1966), emphasizes the small-scale 
farming unit. According to this model, increases in 
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productivity and income result from the application of labor 
intensive, capital-saving technologies. Farmers rely on 
divisible innovations, e.g., high-yielding varieties and 
fertilizer-responsive crop varieties which have figured in the 
"Green Revolution" (Johnston and Clark, 1982). Therefore, 
advances in agricultural production are contingent upon 
divisible technologies and the conservation of small-scale 
farming operations. 
Unlike the unimodal, the bimodal strategy allows for the 
existence of both large-scale (commercial farms) and small-
scale farm units. This dualistic model is usually referred to 
as the "Mexican model" and is prevalent in most countries of 
the Latin America continent. The increase in productivity, 
according to this strategy, is concentrated on a subsector of 
large farms which adopt labor-saving, capital-intensive 
technologies (Johnston and Clark, 1982:71). The small scale 
farm units generally contribute only a small portion to the 
country's overall agricultural sales. 
As the name implies, the "industrialization-first" 
strategy stresses agricultural development as secondary to 
industrial development. National agricultural policy 
emphasizes the idea that agricultural development plays a 
supportive role for national industrial development. In order 
to have cheap food available for consumption in the industrial 
sector, the government encourages the application of 
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labor-saving, capital-using technologies which allow farmers 
to produce huge amounts of food available in the market 
economy. This will directly benefit those who work in the 
industrial sector. Within the agricultural sector, the 
large-scale farmers are the primary beneficiary of this type 
of policy. This differential impact occurs because the large 
farmers possess more investment capital and are in a better 
position to gain access to input subsidies and credit than are 
small farmers. This strategy often leads to increased 
concentration in agriculture where food production is 
controlled by the few and creates a dualistic situation in the 
agricultural sector. 
The fourth alternative is the collectivization strategy. 
This strategy requires far more than the mere application of 
agricultural technologies. Rather, it requires a fundamental 
alteration in the organization of agricultural production as 
well as in the distribution of the means of production. The 
ideological goal behind this strategy is to assure the 
equitable distribution of the benefits for those involved in 
the production process. Land reform and the establishment of 
farmers' organizations (e.g., cooperatives) are generally the 
major tasks of the government. Instead of focusing on the 
application of labor-saving, capital intensive technologies, 
this strategy emphasizes a labor intensive, capital-saving 
pattern of agricultural production which creates a greater 
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opportunity for the full utilization of labor in the rural 
sector (Johnston and Clark, 1982; Bryant and White, 1982). 
As in most developing countries, agriculture is the most 
basic occupation of people in Thailand. Although agricultural 
production contributes only 25 percent to the Gross National 
Product (GNP) of the country, it employs about 70 percent of 
the population, or about 35 million people (Apapirom, 1984). 
In addition, the agricultural sector plays a significant role 
in securing foreign currencies, accounting for almost 60 
percent of the total export value. However, the economic 
growth of this sector has increased only about 4-5 percent per 
year, which is relatively lower than the industrial and 
service sectors. Also, farmers' incomes are much lower when 
compared with those employed in the industrial and service 
sectors (Apapirom, 1984:32). 
Thailand has become a full participant in the "Green 
Revolution" and has focused on the unimodal strategy for 
agricultural development. This approach views technological 
problems as the fundamental obstacles in the agricultural 
production process. Therefore, in order to achieve a higher 
level of production and efficiency, advances in technological 
research and dissemination of this research is essential. The 
diffusion and application of agricultural technologies seems 
to be the solution for solving the problems in the food 
production system (Bryant and White, 1982). Agricultural 
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technologies have been transferred to the farmers through 
various communication channels in the hope that farmers will 
take advantage of them, thereby increasing production, which, 
in turn, will result in improvements in their income and 
well-being. As is the case in most developing countries which 
follow this approach, the success of the development effort is 
dependent upon both the socio-economic characteristics of the 
farmers and the nature of the delivery system. 
Research on the adoption and diffusion of agricultural 
innovations has traditionally addressed the influences of 
socioeconomic and psychological factors on the adoption 
behavior of farmers. Whether or not a farmer adopts a new 
idea depends upon the socioeconomic and psychological 
characteristics of the farmer. Many empirical studies have 
shown that the economic status (measured by income, farm size) 
of farmers and the relative attributes of the innovations are 
correlated to the adoption behavior. Major studies in this 
area include Rogers (1983), Abd-Ella and Hoiberg (1981), Brown 
et al. (1976), Qartrell et al. (1973) and Cancian (1957; 
1976). Social factors that have been investigated include 
family size, educational level, the decision making structure 
of the family, social participation, and the cosmopoliteness 
of the farmers. Some studies have also included ecological 
factors in their studies (Abd-Ella and Hoiberg, 1981; Ashby 
and Coward, 1980). These studies tend to use the individual 
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the unit of analysis and focus on the individual-blame 
perspective. This perspective is defined as the tendency to 
hold an individual responsible for his or her own problems, 
rather than implicating the system of which the individual is 
a part (Caplan and Nelson, 1973). 
A recent model that has been advanced argues that the 
system by which the innovations have been diffused must be 
taken into account when analyzing the adoption behavior of 
farmers (Brown, 1981). Since all social systems consist of 
the patterned activities of a number of individuals 
(subsystems) which are complementary or interdependent with 
respect to some common outputs or outcomes, the integration 
and coordination of the subsystems are the main mechanisms 
that bring the system together for unified functioning (Katz 
and Kahn, 1978). Therefore, the agricultural production 
system depends upon the coordination of the subsystems or the 
organization's parts. Lack of coordination within the 
agricultural support system may make it difficult for farmers 
to benefit from innovative agricultural technologies. For 
example, even though extension workers may advise farmers to 
use new crop varieties, fertilizer, and insecticides, if these 
innovations are not made available by cooperatives or by 
retail businesses in the local area, it is very difficult for 
farmers to gain access to the emerging innovations. The 
application of new ideas in the agricultural operation can 
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result in increases in agricultural outputs which farmers may 
sell in the market for cash. Againr farmers are dependent on 
the development of the market structure and price control 
system to assure a market for their products at a reasonable 
price. This example illustrates that in isolation, the farm 
system can function only at a limited capacity. In order to 
keep the farm system functioning properly, its component parts 
must also function efficiently and cooperatively. 
In reality, one cannot expect the full cooperation of all 
agricultural support organizations. Indeed, component parts 
of a system may engage in conflict with one other. This might 
occur because organizations function in different 
environments, possess different characteristics and may have 
conflicting goals. In other words, the nature of interorgan-
izational relations is not based on the complete assumption of 
either cooperation or conflict. Cooperation and conflict 
among organizations may selectively emerge as a result of the 
organization's interests, characteristics, and environment. 
It is assumed that these forms of interorganizational outcomes 
among agricultural support organizations will ultimately 
affect the food production system at the farm level, 
especially in terms of the access and the application of 
agricultural technologies which are the main concern of the 
agricultural development strategy used in Thailand. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the 
factors that determine cooperation and/or conflict in the 
interorganizational relations among agricultural support 
organizations within Khon Kaen province, Thailand. Efforts 
will also be made to assess the nature of interorganizational 
relations between these local organizations and relevant 
organizations at the provincial level. 
Significance of the Study 
This study will be beneficial not only to the study of 
interorganizational relations but also to the process of rural 
development in Thailand and other developing countries. • This 
study is one of the few studies which attempts to investigate 
the state of interorganizational cooperation and conflict 
simultaneously. 
With regard to rural development in Thailand, the results 
of this study will assist the government in determining what 
should be done to improve the agricultural service and 
delivery system. Understanding the state of cooperation and 
conflict and its causes is necessary to that effort. 
Improvement in the service and delivery system will facilitate 
farmers gaining improved access to the innovations which they 
can then use to increase the level of food production. This 
will, in turn, lead to an improvement in the standard of 
living among the nation's farmers. In addition, this study 
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may contribute to the development of models useful to other 
countries which can hopefully benefit from the utilization of 
the research results in local planning and administrative 
development. 
Roles of Agricultural Support Organizations 
in Khon Kaen Province, Thailand 
Khon Kaen is a province in the Northeast region of 
Thailand. According to the latest census, conducted in 1980, 
Khon Kaen has a population of more than one million. A 
majority of the province's residents engage in agricultural 
occupations: Rice is the major crop with about two-thirds of 
the area devoted to rice production (National Statistical 
Office, 1984). The rest of the cultivated areas are devoted 
to the production of cassava, sugar cane, kenaf and corn. 
Eighteen of the province's twenty districts were classified as 
high density poverty areas in 1982, which involves 484,498 
people from 77,624 households (The Office of Committee for 
National Economic and Social Development, 1982). In 1983, 
thirteen districts were still considered as areas with high 
rates of poverty (The Office of Committee for National 
Economic and Social Development, 1984). 
To facilitate food production and the process of 
technology transfer, organizational arrangements are very much 
needed. For example, Johnston and Clark (1982) suggest that 
facilitator organizations are needed to perform allocation 
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tasks/ including the provision of farm households, local 
groups, and organizations with reliable access to the range of 
goods and services required for increasing production and 
rural well-being, e.g., cooperatives, extension offices. In 
addition, it is also necessary that knowledge resources, both 
technical and managerial, be available for use in these local 
subsystems. 
As in many other developing countries, the Department of 
Agricultural Extension was established in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives as the major 
organization responsible for the process of technology 
transfer and the facilitation of food production at the 
individual farm level (Department of Agricultural Extension, 
1983). Private organizations are also encouraged to 
participate in the efforts of agricultural development. The 
private sector plays a significant role in providing credit, 
supplying input subsidies, and marketing agricultural 
products. 
It has long been brought to the attention of the Thai 
government that cooperation between governmental and private 
organizations is a necessary condition for the accomplishment 
of agricultural development goals (Apapirom, 1984). The main 
argument is that while governmental agencies specialize in 
technical and managerial knowledge, including research, 
training, and technical know-how, private organizations are 
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more skillful in the areas of marketing and retail business. 
Therefore, it is argued that the combined efforts of the two 
sectors are really beneficial to the food production system 
because the sectors play a complementary role to one another. 
Thus, the joint efforts of all organizations both public and 
private, will be a partial determinant to the extent of 
agricultural development. 
For the purpose of this study, the focus is primarily 
directed to the roles played by these agricultural support 
organizations, both public and private, at the provincial 
(regional) and district (local) level. 
Provincial organizations 
At the provincial level, there are five primary 
agricultural support organizations engaged in the 
dissemination of technological and managerial information to 
farmers, including two rice research stations, a field crop 
research center, the Faculty of Agriculture at Khon Kaen 
University, and the Office of Commerce. The rice research 
stations and the field crop research center are mainly 
responsible for conducting experiments of new varieties of 
rice or field crops. Much research attention has been 
directed to the appropriateness of new agricultural 
technologies to the geographical environment. The main 
concern of these research agencies is to test the potential of 
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new agricultural technologies before they are transferred to 
individual farm operators. 
The Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University, offers 
both undergraduate and graduate level study in agriculture 
(e.g., agronomy, animal science, soil science, entomology, 
agricultural extension, agricultural economics). Several 
research projects have been carried out by university 
scientists, with the major projects in the area of farming 
systems and cropping systems. These two research projects 
involve scientists from various disciplines whose efforts 
combine to provide a holistic view of farm operations and how 
new ideas coordinate with the existing socioeconomic and 
ecological environment of the farm households. In addition, 
the faculty also conducts agricultural extension programs such 
as short-course training and field trials (Khon Kaen 
University, 1984) 
The training programs are designed to select farmers 
from different locations in the Northeast region to live on 
campus for one year. A small plot of land and a house are 
provided and farmers and their families grow crops and raise 
livestock under the direct supervision of staff members from 
the Faculty of Agriculture. New agricultural technologies, 
managerial skills are transferred to farmers during this 
on-campus training. The main objective is to provide fanners 
with the opportunity to become familiar with new agricultural 
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technologies which enables them to apply them properly on 
their own farms. 
The Office of Commerce, Khon Kaen province, provides 
information about the marketing and pricing structure of 
agricultural products. This information is sent to all 
relevant agricultural support organizations in the province 
including, e.g., the research stations, university, extension 
offices, and cooperatives. Television and radio stations are 
used as communication channels to disseminate the information 
to farmers and other public audiences. In addition, a weekly 
newsletter is published to report all the news related to the 
current price structure and market of agricultural products. 
The newsletter is senb to almost 50 villages, to television 
and radio stations, and to the editors of local newspapers 
(The Office of Commerce, 1984). 
District organizations 
A local extension office is located in each of the 
districts. Extension's primary function is to provide the 
farmer with information on new agricultural technologies and 
to provide technical assistance relevant to the farm 
operation. Extension agents are also responsible for 
operating demonstration plots and exhibiting how new ideas can 
be incorporated into existing farm operations. Every two 
weeks, extension workers are required to attend training 
sessions so that they can acquire updated information about 
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research results and new agricultural technologies which can 
be conveyed to farmers. 
Retail businesses play a significant role in making the 
input subsidies available to farmers. Most retail businesses 
are run by owners and their family members. Occasionally, che 
businesses hire one or two workers to do the heavy work, such 
as moving fertilizer bags, etc. These independent retail 
businesses vary in size of operation. In large retail 
businesses, a complete inventory of input subsidies are 
maintained. Some of these large retail businesses even have 
their own extension service programs designed to advertise 
chemical products. Retail businesses might also arrange a 
demonstration dealing with the use and the efficiency of 
certain brands of insecticides. These programs are usually 
sponsored by the chemical producers located in Bangkok. In 
general, most retail businesses within a district are aware of 
each other. In fact, it is a common practice to borrow 
chemicals from one another when a certain brand is temporarily 
out of stock. Through this mechanism, businesses can retain 
their regular customers. It is also common for some retail 
businesses to allow farmers to purchase the products they need 
on credit. Farmers have to pay the businesses back after the 
harvesting season, of course, with some interest. 
The agricultural cooperative can be considered a multi­
purpose organization organized by the farmers under the 
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supervision of the Department of Agricultural Cooperative 
Extension, Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives. The main objectives of the agricultural 
cooperatives are providing credit, supplying input subsidies, 
banking, disseminating agricultural information, and marketing 
agricultural products (The Office of Commerce, 1984). Loans 
are made available to farmers at an interest rate of 14 
percent per year. There are essentially two sources of 
funding for credit services. One part of the fund comes from 
membership fees. The other comes from loans that the 
cooperative obtains through the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). Cooperatives pay interest 
rates of 11 percent per year on these loans. Therefore, the 
cooperatives earn roughly a 3 percent benefit margin. In most 
cases, the money collected from the cooperative members is not 
sufficient for providing loans to all members and must, 
therefore, depend upon loans from BAAC. 
Credit can also be obtained from the BAAC by farmers who 
are not members of a cooperative. BAAC is a governmental bank 
established in 1966 in the Ministry of Finance. There is one 
BAAC branch in every district. Roughly 45 percent of the 
loans from BAAC are given to rice producers. BAAC maintains 
the same interest rates as the cooperatives. Unlike BAAC, 
commercial banks provide credit to farmers at a higher 
interest rate and generally limit credit to prosperous 
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farmers. The commercial banks provide 78 percent of their 
loans to diversified crop production (Ministry of Commerce, 
1984). 
As far as the marketing of rice is concerned, rice-mills 
tend to dominate the system for this major crop. The owners 
of the rice-mills may go out of the village to buy rice grain, 
or farmers may transport their product to the rice-mills 
themselves. Rice grain is processed by the rice-mills and is 
made available for local consumption or is transported to 
Bangkok for export. 
Directly or indirectly, farmers have to depend on the 
services provided by all of these major agricultural support 
organizations. To achieve the goals of agricultural 
development, one must comprehend the role played by both 
public and private organizations. Cooperation between 
governmental and private organizations seems to be the most 
significant factor in agricultural development efforts under 
the current Thai structure of agriculture. Based on Bacharach 
and Lawler's (1980) model, some governmental and private 
organizations function as the input set (providing inputs) 
while others act as the output set (marketing the farm 
products). The functions performed by these organizations 
partially determines the success of agricultural development. 
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Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters covering 
the statement of the problem, the theoretical framework, the 
methodology, the data analysis and findings, and the 
conclusion. 
Chapter I has been concerned with setting forth the 
statement of the problem, the objectives of the study and 
attempting to provide a description of the social and 
organizational background as they relate to rural development. 
Chapter II describes the theoretical framework of the 
study. Social systems theory is applied to describe the 
linkages of the farm-households to other relevant agricultural 
systems. Functionalism proceeds on the assumption that all 
parts of the system have to work cooperatively for the 
survival of the whole. Conflict theorists oppose the 
functionalist's view by arguing that the relationships of the 
parts are often contradictory. Van den Berghe (1963) proposes 
a theoretical synthesis that, in fact, both the funtionalists 
and conflict theorists conceive of the same relationship but 
from different vantage points or "look at the different sides 
of the same coin." Therefore, cooperation and conflict can be 
investigated simultaneously. The review of literature and 
empirical studies identify several factors which determine 
interorganizational cooperation and conflict; local 
dependency, goal similarity, awareness, domain consensus. 
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interdependence, competition, and frequency of contacts. 
Hypotheses predicting relationships among these variables are 
also formulated in this chapter. 
Chapter III summarizes the major concepts in the proposed 
model and how each is measured,- the sampling procedures, the 
general characteristics of the samples, data collecting and 
analysis. The Linear Structural Relationship (LISREL), which 
is used for data analysis, is briefly discussed. 
Chapter IV discusses the findings of the study. The 
discussion is divided into two parts. Part I presents the 
description of interorganizational cooperation and conflict 
based on a descriptive analysis of the mean value of the 
variables. In addition, a bivariate analysis is also 
presented. Part II presents the hypothesis and model testing. 
The hypotheses and the proposed model of the relationships 
among the organizations at the provincial and local levels, 
and among those at the local level are tested and evaluated 
separately. Several measures are employed to evaluate the 
goodness of fit of the model to the data. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the results of the 
hypothesis and model testing. The implications of the study 
to both further research and policy formulation are discussed. 
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From the system's perspective, a farm can be considered as 
a social system which obtains resources and information from 
its environment so as to produce agricultural products for the 
consumption of its own and other systems. According to Olson 
(1968:21), a system is defined as a set of interrelated 
activities that is distinguished from its environment by some 
kind of boundary that interacts with its environment in a 
variety of ways, that exhibits numerous dynamic internal 
processes, that displays patterns of ordering which are 
relatively stable through time, and that constitutes a single 
entity with its own distinctive characteristics. In short, a 
system is a bounded and unified set of interrelated, dynamic, 
and stable processes. Olson also points out that since 
systems models are used in many fields besides sociology, that 
their use in the social sciences can be thought of as the 
application of a system's model to social phenomena. 
Loomis (1960) emphasizes that the social system can be 
viewed as the patterned interaction of members. It is the 
uniformity of interaction, not the people, that is the main 
component of the social system. A social system can be 
conceptualized from two perspectives: it can be conceived as 
a concrete interactive social structure, such as a family or 
church, or as a more abstract unit composed of social 
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interactions and the cultural factors which structure these 
interactions (Loomis and Beegle, 1975:1-2). 
Since family and farm are difficult to distinguish from 
each other, it is often conceived as a unified unit. Frawley 
(1973) conceptualizes the family farm as a social system 
consisting of two subsystems, the family and the farm. 
Abd-Ella (1979:16) points out that the family farm is composed 
of two levels of social organization, the primary and the 
managerial levels. His explanation is based on Parson's 
typology which specifies the four levels of social 
organization: primary, managerial, institutional, and 
societal levels. Each of these levels may be viewed as a 
social system, and every level of a social system may be 
considered as a subsystem of the next higher level system. 
Therefore, the family farm functions as a subsystem of a 
larger system, and exists within a social environment with 
which it must interact (Abd-Ella, 1979:18). Thus, the family 
farm is not an isolated social system. Rather, it must 
interact with other social units which make up its environment 
and from which it receives the resources and information 
necessary for its survival. 
The environment of the family farm can be divided into two 
categories: 
a) the task environment (micro-environment, Zey-Ferrell, 
1979) refers to those elements that are relevant for 
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goal setting and goal attainment. This category may 
include other family farms, cooperatives, and 
extension service agencies. 
b) the general environment (macro-environment, 
Zey-Ferrell, 1979) consists of the major societal 
factors that are not directly related to farming 
goals. This category may include the mass media, 
religious organizations and governmental units, among 
others. 
Osborn and Hunt (1974:232) indicate that the task environment 
includes that portion of the total setting which is relevant 
to goal setting and goal attainment. Also, the task 
environment can be viewed as multi-faceted, pluralistic, and 
composed of other distinguishable organizations that are 
relevant to the establishment of domain consensus and exchange 
(Thompson, 1967:28-30). The pluralistic nature of task 
environments means that each focal organization may have to 
exchange resources with not one, but several other 
organizations, each of which is itself involved with other 
organizations in networks of interdependence, with its own 
domain and task environment (Mulford, 1984:45). 
In most developing countries, the family farm performs the 
fundamental function of producing the agricultural products 
for their own consumption and for other systems. Recently, 
efforts have been made to increase agricultural production to 
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support industrial growth and to contribute to the welfare of 
the rural population (Grant, 1979). To increase agricultural 
production, innovative technologies and improved 
infrastructures are needed to support the use of high-yield 
varieties, which will result in the increase of crop yields. 
According to Brown's (1981) market and infrastructure 
perspective, the opportunity to adopt an innovation is 
unequal, an assumption opposite to that of the traditional 
approach. According to this perspective, whether or not 
' 
individuals or households get access to and adopt the 
innovation is dependent mainly on the role of the government 
and private institutions in making it available to them. The 
diffusion of innovations involves two basic stages: the 
establishment of diffusion agencies, and the strategies the 
diffusion agencies use to induce adoption among the population 
in the service areas, e.g., price and market strategies. The 
diffusion agency may use a promotional communication strategy 
to get the target audiences informed of what is available to 
them. However, the potential adopter may or may not have 
access to the innovation, which depends upon the price of the 
innovation, the ability of potential adopters to obtain 
financial resources such as a loan, and the potential 
adopter's proximity to infrastructures relevant to using the 
innovation, such as energy, service, or delivery systems. In 
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short, the market and infrastructure perspective places 
primary emphasis on the supply side of diffusion. 
Grant (1979) points out that inputs must be made available 
to the farmers in adequate quantities and at the right times 
and places and that inputs be supplied by reliable delivery 
systems. The farmers must have the knowledge and skill to 
manage and operate the whole agricultural operation with new 
high-yield varieties. In addition, such infrastructural 
elements as roads and vehicles are needed for facilitating the 
transportation of farm products. For those products that need 
to be protected and preserved after harvesting, practical 
systems of storage facilities will be required. 
The increase of agricultural production requires the 
involvement of both public and private agricultural support 
organizations in six basic functions; 
1) Research ; research can be conducted by a university, an 
agricultural college, or an agricultural research center. 
Research projects should be conducted not only to further 
technological advances, but also to solve the problems of 
local areas. 
2) Educational and informational services ; these services 
provide opportunities for farmers to gain access to new 
farming methods. This function is commonly known as 
"agricultural extension." This function is important 
because agricultural innovations are new to the farmers 
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and they will need to gain access to professional and 
technical advice and assistance in dealing with new 
problems such as new plant diseases which farmers cannot 
solve without specialized help (Grant, 1979:39). The 
organizations or agencies involved include universities, 
extension offices, and small retail businesses. 
3) Production and supply; reference is made here to 
production and supply of input subsidies such as seeds, 
fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides. These subsidies 
can be made available through agricultural cooperatives, 
small retail businesses, and the extension service 
offices. 
4) Credit services ; these services are made available 
through the bank for agriculture and agricultural 
cooperatives, and other commercial banks. Since 
agricultural technologies are often costly to adopt, 
farmers who lack sufficient capital to invest in 
agricultural innovations might need credit services to 
finance the farm operation. Lack of credit accessibility 
may hinder the adoption of innovations. Havens and Flinn 
(1975) found a significant correlation between the total 
amount of credit used per acre and the adoption of new 
coffee varieties among farmers in Colombia. 
5) Pricing and marketing : providing the pricing and 
marketing mechanism for agricultural products is the 
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responsibility of the department of commerce, agricultural 
cooperatives, and private companies. 
6) Educational and job training programs; these programs are 
administered by universities, agricultural colleges and 
private colleges and produce trained manpower needed in 
the agricultural sector. 
Thus, the application of new agricultural technologies in 
the production process of the family farm requires inputs 
(basically resources and information) and facilities for the 
distribution of the agricultural products. These needs can be 
provided by both public and private agricultural support 
organizations. The availability of facilities and services 
provided by the agricultural support organizations partly 
contribute to the variation in the adoption behavior of 
farmers. A breakdown in the provision of services by the 
organizations may prevent the farmers from adopting 
agricultural innovations. Accordingly, agricultural support 
organizations have to work cooperatively in the provision of 
all facilities and services needed for the production of the 
family farms. 
Organizational cooperation is perceived not only as a 
means for enhancing the quality of public service delivery 
systems, but also as a way to improve the overall efficiency 
of the government. Cooperation is defined as deliberate 
relations between otherwise autonomous organizations for the 
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joint accomplishment of individual operating goals 
(Schermerhorn, 1975). That is, organizations pursue their own 
goals and thus retain autonomy, while at the same time 
orienting their actions toward a common issue outcome (Warren 
et al., 1974; Mulford, 1980). The cooperation process may 
require a rather small investment on the part of the inter­
acting organizations, but it does mean that they have to take 
each other's actions into account. Cooperation is typically 
viewed as a form of voluntary interaction and would be found 
in relationships based on exchange or voluntary agreement 
(Morrissey et al., 1982:88). 
The notion of cooperation is based on a functionalist 
perspective. From the functionalist point of view, society 
can be considered as an organism which is a self-sufficient 
totality. Like all other social systems, the society 
confronts problems of two kinds: it has to balance problems 
of relations with the environment (external) with problems of 
coordination (internal), and it has to balance short-term, 
expressive needs (cor.summatory) with actions directed toward 
the achievement of long-term goals (instrumental). Under 
these two dimensional problems, the society has to perform 
four basic functions so as to maintain societal equilibrium, 
and to achieve the survival goal. The four basic functions 
are adaptation (A), goal-attainment (G), integration (I), and 
latency (L) (Parsons, 1951). Adaptation is the problem of 
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securing sufficient resources from the environment for goal 
achievement. Goal-attainment has to do with setting and 
achieving long-range goals. Integration refers to the problem 
of securing the mutual adjustment of the parts of the system. 
Latency or pattern-maintenance has to do with maintaining the 
distinctive pattern of the system despite internal processes 
of change and new inputs to the system (Wilson, 1983:85-86). 
These functions are performed by supports which in turn are 
dependent on the whole. The system influences the existence 
and the structure of the parts. 
According to the functional perspective, society rests on 
the consensus and cooperation of its members. Social order is 
maintained through the presence of a common value system 
(Wilson, 1983). The existence of the whole is dependent upon 
three systemic properties which are the center of the 
functionalist argument; interdependence, equilibrium, and 
differentiation (Strasser and Randall, 1981; Wilson, 1983). 
1) Interdependence is defined as a condition where social 
units must take into account the presence or existence of 
each other. The ensuing linkages among social actors and 
social relations make up a social structure. 
2) Differentiation simply refers to the division of labor in 
a society, which is concerned with the process and the 
outcome of the institutionalization of social roles and 
organizations performing certain functions in society. 
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3) Equilibrium refers to the continued attempt to preserve 
social-structural stability through such self-regulatory 
mechanisms as socialization and social control. 
According to Durkheim (1949) the division of labor within 
society creates a situation of interdependence among groups 
and organizations that form its structure. Therefore, there 
must be a mechanism within a community or society to join the 
interdependent groups and organizations to the other parts of 
the social system which furnish it with, and receive from it, 
various needed products and services (Bates and Bacon, 
1972:374). The interdependent groups and organizations may 
develop two basic types of social relationships: a reciprocal 
relationship and a conjunctive relationship. The reciprocal 
relationship exists when two actors have oriented their 
performance toward a common general function, and thus may be 
regarded as parts of the same system of action (e.g., the 
relationship between teacher and student). On the contrary, 
in the conjunctive relationship, two actors direct their 
performing functions for two distinct systems of action. For 
example, an extension worker who attends a seminar on 
biotechnology at a research station is performing functions 
for the extension office while a researcher who organizes the 
seminar is performing functions for the research station. The 
conjunctive relationships of the two actors occur within an 
interstitial group which is formed when an actor is required 
30 
to leave the boundaries of one group and enter the boundaries 
of another group in order to secure needed goods or services. 
Therefore, the interstitial group lies between two elemental 
groups and has a function of transferring goods and services 
from one group to another (Bates and Bacon, 1972). 
The flow of a system's products and services may occur in 
two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The interdependent 
groups and organizations (subsystems) may be tied to one 
another vertically or horizontally so as to secure or provide 
needed products and services. According to Warren (1978), 
vertical relationship may be defined as the structural and 
functional relation of a social unit of subsystem to extra-
local systems. The term vertical implies the hierarchical 
relationships which may reflect the differences of power and 
authority in the relationships. Horizontal linkages may refer 
to the structural and functional relation of various social 
units and subsystems to each other. This type of relationship 
occurs among parties being in approximately the same 
hierarchical level. The relationship is across the many 
different units and subsystems that operate on the local 
level. 
Regardless of the types of structural and functional 
linkages, functionalism emphasizes the integration of the 
system, a state which can be achieved through value consensus. 
This consensus is implemented through the mechanisms of 
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institutionalization, socialization, and social control. Even 
though conflicts, or dysfunctional elements do exist, they 
tend to resolve themselves or become institutionalized over 
the long run. This is because a system is assumed to be 
self-maintaining and self-regulating in the process of 
achieving a state of equilibrium (Strasser and Randall, 
1981:160). 
However, the relationships of all social units in the 
system are not necessarily in harmony. The state of 
dependency due to the inequality of resource distribution may 
bring about conflict. Conflict may be defined as the level of 
disagreement of dispute that characterizes an interorganiza-
tional relationship. It may involve disagreements or disputes 
over the basic priorities and responsibilities that define a 
relationship, or over the task expectations or role 
performances of a particular position or unit (Goldman, 1966; 
Molnar and Rogers, 1979). 
From the Marxian perspective, social relationships are in 
a state of contradiction. Inequality in the control over the 
means of production is the basis for the emergence of two 
major social classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
In the capitalist mode of production, the social relationships 
of the two classes are in conflict. Since the proletariat 
does not own the means of production, they are dependent on 
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and exploited by the bourgeoisie, who own the means of 
production in the process of producing commodities. 
Marxian analysis follows a dialectical mode of thinking 
which is mainly concerned with conflict and contradiction of 
two opposing social forces. The best known model of the 
dialectic focuses on the thesis - antithesis - synthesis 
(Ritzer, 1983:68). The thesis is defined as the existing 
relationship of classes in a given mode of production. The 
antithesis refers to the emergent conditions that contradict 
the thesis. The consequence of the interaction of these two 
contradictory forces is called the synthesis. Therefore, 
conflicts among economic forces bring about the transformation 
of social structure. 
Dahrendorf (1959) views the inequality in the distribution 
of authority within a given association and the struggle for 
authority as the main sources of conflict. He explains that 
any "imperatively coordinated association" (ICA), e.g., a 
club, a nuclear family, an organization, or a state has its 
own class structure; those who exercise authority, and those 
who are excluded from it. Since the distribution of authority 
within a given association is always dichotomous, different 
positions in relation to authority involve conflicting 
interests, and class conflict revolves around the struggle for 
authority (Dahrendorf, 1959:165-174). Therefore, unlike 
Marxian perspective, Dahrendorf considers political forces. 
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rather than economic ones, as the main sources of conflicts 
between the two classes struggling for authority. Changes in 
the social structure of any ICA depends on those who exercise 
the authority. 
However, a social structure might be considered as a 
dynamic balance of disharmonious parts and are, therefore, 
subject to endless change and redefinition (Horowitz, 
1963:180). It is evident that conflict situations are 
intrinsic to social structure. Accordingly, the form of 
society is defined by the quality and types of conflict 
situations; conflicts and social structure do not exist 
independently. Conflicts related to goals, values, and 
interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon 
which the relationship is founded tend to be functionally 
positive for the social structure. Such conflict stimulates 
the readjustment of norms, values, and power relations within 
the system in accordance with the felt needs of its members 
(Coser, 1956). In short, Coser does not view conflict as the 
social force that necessarily brings about the disruption of 
social structure. Instead, he argues that conflicts may 
enhance the system to readjust norms, values, and power 
relations so that the system can move toward a state of 
equilibrium. However, at the same time, the readjustment can 
create gradual change in social structure. This results in 
what Coser terms the functions of social conflict. 
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Functionalism and conflict theory by themselves, present 
only a one-sided view of society. But the explanations they 
provide are complementary and reconcilable with each other 
(Van den Berghe, 1963). There are at least four points of 
convergence and overlap between these two theories. First, 
both approaches are holistic. Functionalists conceive of 
society as made up of interdependent parts which perform 
specialized functions, are complementary to one another, and 
contribute to a state of equilibrium. Conflict theory also 
stresses the importance of the interdependence of parts, but 
sees them in a conflicting relation. However, different 
elements of a society can simply coexist without being 
complementary, interdependent, or in necessary opposition to 
one another. Secondly, both conflict and consensus can bring 
about positive and negative consequences. Conflict can 
contribute to social integration while consensus can prevent a 
society from making adaptations to change. Thirdly, both 
theories share an evolutionary notion of social change in the 
sense that they presuppose all previous states oc a given 
state of the social system. Finally, both theories are 
fundamentally based on an equilibrium model. This is more 
obvious in the case of functionalism. For conflict theory, 
however, the notion of synthesis carries with it the notion of 
equilibrium of the system (Van den Berghe, 1963). 
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Accordingly, it is irrational to view social relationships 
from a particular perspective. Rather, both perspectives 
should be taken into consideration so that the real conditions 
of social relationships can be investigated. Negandhi (1975) 
observes that conflict relations have been relatively ignored. 
Interorganizational relation specialists tend to emphasize 
cooperation over conflict and seek to discover ways to reduce 
conflict. In fact, conflict and cooperation may exist 
simultaneously and directly complement and reinforce each 
other (Olson, 1968:166-157). Both conflict and cooperation 
can occur between organizations at the same time. Conflict is 
no less positive or natural than cooperation (Bernard, 1949). 
Therefore, cooperation and conflict, which are the main 
elements of functionalism and conflict theory respectively, 
deserve simultaneous investigation. Mulford and Mulford 
(1977) studied the interorganizational perspectives of 
cooperation and conflict by examining the effects of three 
independent variables (organization size, age of members, 
number of activities sponsored) on the cooperative and 
conflicting nature of interorganizational relations. They 
found that larger organizations with a greater range of output 
are more likely than smaller organizations to be involved in 
cooperation, conflict, and mixed relations. Dyads based on 
cooperation and those based on conflict tend to be composed of 
organizations with the same range of output and whose members 
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are recruited from the same age categories. This study showed 
that these three organizational properties can lead the 
organizations to engage in both interorganizational 
cooperation and conflict. 
The determinants of cooperation and conflict 
Generally, a focal organization tries to maintain its 
independence from others. If given the option, organizations 
would prefer not to establish interorganizational relations 
inasmuch as these relations can act as a constraint on their 
subsequent actions (Zeitz, 1980). However, they develop some 
forms of interorganizational relations due not only to the 
need for resource and information exchange, but also because 
of external restraints defining the context within which they 
function. 
Based on the notion of differentiation (or division of 
labor) in the society, each part (subsystem) has to perform 
certain specialized functions for the survival of the whole. 
These individual parts are not self-sufficient, but inter­
dependent. They have to engage in various forms of exchange 
so that they can survive. Parsons points out that even though 
a subsystem performs a particular function for the whole, it 
has to perform the four basic functions (AGIL) necessary for 
its own existence (Turner, 1978:52). They need support from 
other contingent subsystems to fulfill all of their needs and 
to achieve their objectives. Through this mechanism. 
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according to exchange theory, social relations can be main­
tained. In other words, the more the actors are beneficial to 
one another, the more social relations endure. This is 
because each is interested in its own welfare; but in using 
the other as a means to its own end, each must aid the other's 
welfare in order to realize its own benefits (Wilson, 1983). 
As a unit of the larger system, an organization may engage 
in interorganizational relations in order to secure resources 
and information from other organizations. According to 
resource dependency theory, the relations may involve some 
form of exchange of resources and information between two or 
more organizations for their mutual benefit (Cook, 1977). 
Organizations controlling large amounts of resources tend to 
keep other organizations dependent on them because the control 
of resources needed by others can be a source of power. 
Therefore, in the exchange relationships, the dependency of 
one partner on another or an imbalance of power always exists 
(Wilson, 1983). At the same time, however, the dependent 
organizations try to find strategies for the establishment of 
mutual (symmetrical) relations so that the balance of power 
among the parties involved can be maintained. They may 
explore other alternative sources of resources, or develop 
some forms of coalition among the dependent organizations so 
as to strengthen their bargaining position. The degree of 
dependence of the organization is directly proportional to its 
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need for the resource controlled by a particular organization 
and inversely proportional to the availability of the resource 
elsewhere (Hasenfeld, 1984). 
An organization will likely cooperate with other organi­
zations as long as favorable outcomes are anticipated. When 
interorganizational relations are perceived as contrary to the 
interests of the organizations, however, the relations may 
turn to a state of conflict, which may stimulate the parties 
involved to readjust the terms of the relationship. Emphasis 
must also be placed on how an organization defines the 
situation or the context within which the interorganizational 
relations take place. According to symbolic interactionism, 
actors have the capacity to interpret and define the situation 
by using a variety of information sources. Actors do not 
merely respond instinctively to the objects in their 
environment; rather they select out objectives to attend to 
and they choose between alternative behavior responses. 
Therefore, subjective definitions of situations determine 
behavior in those situations (Wilson, 1983). 
Theoretically, there are two sets of variables that might 
affect interorganizational cooperation or conflict. First, 
the interpretive scheme which involves the attitudes, values, 
and perceptions of agency personnel, and secondly, the 
contextual scheme including internal structural properties and 
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environmental factors such as the economy, demographic 
patterns, and resources (Halpert, 1982:56). 
Levine and White (1961:345) proposed a theoretical model 
of dyadic relations, showing that there are three major 
factors leading to interorganizational exchanges; (1) the 
accessibility of each organization to necessary elements from 
sources outside the local system (local dependency), (2) the 
objectives of the organization and particular functions to 
which it allocates the elements it controls (goal similarity), 
and (3) the degree to which domain consensus exists among the 
various organizations. While Wells and Mulford (1983) found 
that mutual dependence or interdependence is significantly 
correlated to all dimensions of exchange activities, Molnar 
and Rogers (1979), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that 
interdependence leads to a state of conflict. Mandated 
linkages may bring about both cooperation and competition 
which in turn causes conflict (Molnar and Rogers, 1979; 
Benson, 1975; Paulson, 1976). The nature and outcome of 
interorganizational relations - cooperation or conflict - may 
ultimately affect the adoption rate among the farmers. 
Local Dependency 
Local dependency refers to the extent to which an 
organization has access to necessary elements from sources 
within the system. For example, organizations that get access 
to essential resources from extralocal agencies are less 
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locally dependent than those which rely only on local 
resources. Levine and White (1961) explain that an 
organization's relative independence from the rest of the 
local system and greater dependence upon a system outside the 
community may produce specific types of disagreements with the 
other agencies within the local system. In other words, when 
an organization has access to extralocal resources, its 
dependency on other community organizations and its 
cooperative linkages with them are low. In addition, 
relationships between localized and nonlocalized agencies 
often involve disputes and disagreements (Morrissey, 1982:45). 
Klonglan et al. (1976) found that localized dependency 
varies according to the hierarchical levels of the 
organization. Agencies at the county level are more likely to 
form interorganizational relations than those at the state 
level. Wells and Mulford (1983) showed that localized 
dependency has a low correlation with exchange variables, 
including information exchange (-.115), resource exchange 
{".054) f joint activities (~.lvO) , fontial agreements ("".08T) , 
and exchange of board members (-.136). In addition, local 
dependency did not significantly correlate with exchange 
activities. On the contrary, organizations that cannot obtain 
resources (income, personnel, etc.) from outside the local 
community, e.g., cooperatives, independent retail businesses, 
local companies, and banks, are more likely to be aware of 
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each other and may engage in some forms of competition for 
personnel or clients. 
Hasenfeld (1984:72) notes that competition among 
industrial organizations center around product 
characteristics, quality, and price. According to Aldrich 
(1975), organizations have two major dimensions of domain; 
input and output. Warren et al. (1975), Aldrich (1975), and 
Aldrich (1976) note that organizations which claim the same 
input and/or output domains are more likely to be in conflict. 
This means that if organizations seek to obtain inputs from 
the same sources of provide the same kinds of services to the 
same kinds of clients, they are more likely to compete with 
each other, which in turn leads to conflict. Mulford and 
Mulford (1977) however, have shown that organizations which 
try to recruit members from the same age categories are more 
likely to interact than are organizations that do not. In 
addition, local dependency may bring about the development of 
domain consensus among constituent organizations. Domain 
consensus may be viewed as the extent of agreement and 
disagreement among organizations involved in an interorgani-
zational relationship on the needs and problems, the goals and 
means of the service delivery system (Van de Ven and Ferry, 
1980) . 
Since social actors are goal seeking, and since they seek 
to maximize their rewards and minimize their costs, they tend 
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to pursue the preferred anticipated outcomes (organizational 
interests) (Wilson, 1983). Also, when resources are scarce 
and are not available from extra-community sources, the 
organizations have to compete for those essential resources. 
Under these conditions they are less likely to accept each 
other as the legitimate agency to deliver services to clients 
(farmers). They are less likely to consider each other as 
interdependent units. Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
advanced: 
HI: Organizations having a high degree of local dependency 
are more likely to perceive domain consensus. 
H2: Organizations having a high degree of local dependency 
are more likely to perceive interdependence with other 
organizations. 
H3: Organizations having a high degree of local dependency 
are more likely to compete with other organizations. 
Goal Similarity 
Organizations that have similar goals are more likely to 
work together. Re id (1964:421) argues that exchanges are mors 
likely between organizations with similar goals because such 
organizations have a stake in the goal attainment of others; 
its own goals can be achieved most effectively with the 
assistance of the resources of the others. Re id also points 
out that goal similarity promotes cohesion between organi­
zations and leads to more extensive and stable exchanges. The 
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hypothesis has been made that the greater the similarity of 
mutually dependent goals, the greater the interdependence and 
hence the greater the extent and the stability of exchanges. 
However/ Simmel (1955) noted that low similarity often leads 
to interaction on a restrictive basis, whereas the more that 
is shared in common, the greater the potential grounds for 
conflict. This argument is consistent with the assumption of 
the cooperative model of network formation which states that 
social welfare will be maximized when organizations with 
partially differentiated goals consciously cooperate to attain 
a collective purpose (Laumann et al., 1978). Following this 
notion, Paulson (1976) argues that goal similarity can bring 
about competition rather than coordination. Paulson supports 
his argument by referring to the Guetzkow's study in 1966 
which showed that organizations with largely identical 
activities are more likely to compete with each other, while 
those with largely differentiated activities are largely 
cooperative. . Therefore, Paulson hypothesizes that the greater 
the difference between two organization's goals, the greater 
the perceived cooperative interaction. Even though he found 
differences in organizational goals significantly correlated 
with perceived cooperative interaction, the direction of the 
relationship was inverse. This means that the smaller the 
differences between two organizations' goals (goal 
similarity) , the greater the perceived cooperative 
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interaction. Paulson (1976) also noted that goal 
differentiation can lead organizations to accept each other. 
He argued that the greater the difference between two 
organizations' goals, the greater the perceived domain 
consensus. However, he did not find support for his argument; 
goal differences were not significantly correlated with domain 
consensus. 
According to exchange theory, actors are assumed to be 
goal seeking and to prefer some goals over others. They also 
seek to maximize their rewards and minimize their costs; they 
always direct their actions toward preferred anticipated 
outcomes. Therefore, organizations with similar goals are 
more likely to cooperate with each other. This is because 
they can reduce the redundancy of services and the abuse by 
clients known as "double dipping" (Rogers et al., 1982:4). 
Aiken and Hage (1968) point out that the interorganizational 
coordination can help organizations economize by sharing costs 
of new programs, by increasing the size of their resource 
pool, and by reducing the risk of innovation, because each 
provides only a portion of the joint venture capital. The 
realization of this advantage leads the organizations to 
recognize the state of interdependence, and form a domain 
consensus. However, goal similarity can also bring about 
competition because resources are scarce. Goal achievement by 
one organization may affect the existence of the other. 
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Organizations may perceive high competition when functioning 
in an environment that is composed of organizations with 
compatible goals. This happens because, according to symbolic 
interactionism, what actors think is happening is more 
important than what is actually going on. Actors' behaviors 
are always influenced by subjective definitions of situations 
(Wilson, 1983). Based on this discussion, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated; 
H4; Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
cooperate with each other. 
H5; Organizations with similar goals are less likely to 
initiate conflict with each other. 
H6: Organizations with similar goals are more likely to form 
domain consensus. 
H7: Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
perceive mutual interdependence. 
H8; Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
compete with each other. 
Awareness 
Awareness refers to the extent to which agency contact 
persons are knowledgeable about the goals and services of each 
others' organizations, and the extent to which they have known 
each other on a personal basis (Morrissey et al., 1982). 
Since organization is not a self-sufficient unit, it has to 
rely on resources and information from other organizations in 
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the environment. The recognition that goals and services are 
provided by others increases the alternatives for setting the 
strategies to cope with change in the environment. The 
acquaintance with other organizations' staff members can be 
beneficial to a focal organization in terms of resource and 
information flows. Klonglan et al. (1976) found that there is 
a hierarchy of awareness. The first level involves the 
recognition of the existence of other organizations and their 
activities. The second level refers to the acquaintance among 
staff members of the organizations. The next level of 
awareness involves the specific kind of interactions, e.g., 
joint board membership among directors. 
Based on the studies of Van de Ven and Ferry (1980) and 
Boje and Whetten (1979), awareness can be divided into two 
levels. At the general level, the boundary spanners of an 
organization are familiar with goals and services of other 
organizations. At the second level, awareness involves the 
interpersonal ties of staff members in the network of 
organizations, and the extent to which they are acquainted. 
The interpersonal relationship is emphasized as a crucial 
factor in interorganizational relations during the period of 
environmental turbulence (Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981). 
Hall suggests that a higher level of interpersonal ties seems 
to be linked to a higher level of interorganizational 
interactions. Therefore, the interorganizational relations do 
not occur unless the relevant organizations recognize the 
potential or actual interdependence among them (Levine and 
White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Hall, 1982). 
From a phenomenological perspective, Shutz (1967) 
maintains that "stock knowledge at hand" is an important basis 
for actors in dealing with others in the environment. The 
"stock knowledge at hand" refers to such things as rules, 
social recipes, conceptions of appropriate conduct, and other 
types of information, all of which can be learned through the 
process of socialization (Turner, 1978). Turner (1986) argues 
that the term "stock knowledge at hand" is compatible with 
Mead's notion of the "significant other." According to Mead, 
actors are seen as capable of assuming the overall perspective 
of a community, or its general beliefs, values, and norms. 
Thus, actors can take appropriate responses to others and 
expand their evaluative self-images from the basis of the 
community's standards and expectations. In this case, the 
awareness of other organizations can be viewed as a component 
of the stock knowledge at hand, and is consistent with Mead's 
assumption about an actor's capability. 
Thus, a focal organization seeks appropriate conduct in 
dealing with others in the environment when taking the goals, 
services, and expectations of others into consideration. It 
can also develop the strategies to deal with changes in the 
environment which, to some extent, are beyond its control. 
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The awareness of others* organizational goals and services may 
lead the organization to realize potential or actual inter­
dependence. Knowledge about other organizations may create a 
mutual understanding and acceptance of one another. This 
occurs because, based on the assumptions of positivism, actors 
always act rationally. However, it can also lead to a state 
of competition if the involved organizations recognize the 
potential or actual competition they might engage in. 
According to symbolic interactionism, actors are assumed to be 
involved in reality construction; what the actors perceive as 
real will influence their behavior (Wilson, 1983). From the 
exchange theory's perspective, social actors are assumed to 
avoid pain and maximize pleasure. They are goal seekers, and 
prefer some goals over others (Wilson, 1983). Therefore, 
competition among the involved actors cannot be avoided; each 
actor will compete with one another to accomplish its goals. 
Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses 
can be formulated: 
H9; The more organizations are aware of one another, the 
more likely they will develop domain consensus. 
HlO: The more organizations are aware of one another, the 
more likely they will perceive interdependence. 
Hll; The more organizations are aware of one another, the 
more likely they will compete with each other. 
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Domain consensus 
Domain consensus is the degree to which an organization's 
claim to a specific domain (goal function) is recognized by 
another organization (Aldrich, 1972). In other words, domain 
consensus concerns the extent to which parties in an inter-
organizational relationship agree or disagree on the needs and 
problems of the service delivery system, the means and goals 
of each agency, and the legitimacy of each agency in getting 
involved in the service system (adapted from Van de Ven and 
Ferry, 1980). Levine and White (1961) consider domain 
consensus as a prerequisite to interorganizational exchanges. 
The domain of an organization consists of the specific goals 
it wishes to pursue and the functions it undertakes in order 
to implement its goals. Benson et al. (1973:53) point out 
that domain consensus directly influences coordination of 
work; cooperation in dyads where there is little domain 
consensus may be akin to trading with the enemy. Therefore, 
the reciprocal acceptance of goal and functional legitimacy is 
important for the development of interorganizational 
coordination (Rogers, 1984). In other words, the greater the 
perceived domain consensus between two organizations, the 
greater the perceived cooperative interaction (Paulson, 
1976:315). Paulson explains that when organizations do not 
accept one another's goals and functions, low domain -
consensus, negative qualities of presumptuousness will be 
50 
attributed to the other organization, and negative sanctions 
for cooperating with the other organization will develop. 
In his empirical study, Paulson (1976) found that domain 
consensus contributed significantly to the verification of 
perceived cooperative interaction. Also, in Wells and 
Mulford's (1983) study, domain consensus was found to be 
significantly correlated with three dimensions of exchange 
activities; information exchange, joint activities, and 
formal agreement. However, Schmidt and Kochan (1977), Hall et 
al. (1977) and Cook (1977) argue that interorganizational 
relationships do not depend on domain consensus. They suggest 
that the level of consensus does affect the qualities of 
relationships, but not their existence. 
According to positivism, actors are assumed to act 
rationally. Exchange theory maintains that actors estimate 
not only their own utility but the utility of others. From 
the symbolic interactionist's perspective, actors are 
continually involved in reality construction. It is what the 
actors think is happening chat influences their behaviors 
(Wilson, 1983). Under these conditions, organizations will 
evaluate the goals and functions of other organizations so 
that they can see the legitimacy of their involvement in one 
service delivery system. If they agree on goals and functions 
being carried out, they are more likely to cooperate with 
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other organizations. Therefore, the hypotheses can be made 
that; 
H12: Organizations with high domain consensus are more likely 
to cooperate with others. 
H13: Organizations with low domain consensus are more likely 
to engage in conflict. 
H14; Organizations with high domain consensus are more likely 
to enter into frequent contact. 
Perceived interdependence 
Perceived interdependence refers to the extent to which 
each organization perceives that its own goals can be achieved 
most effectively with the assistance or the resources of the 
other (Reid, 1964). Thomas (1957) points out that inter­
dependence can involve both organizational goals and means. 
According to resource dependency theory, organizations try to 
develop symmetrical relationships with one another. In the 
symmetrical relationship, all parties are aware that one 
organization cannot achieve its goals without the support of 
the other. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note that in a situation where 
the resource is scarce, and the organizations are intercon­
nected, the organizations are in a state of interdependence. 
They explain that munificence (the availability of resources) 
and interconnectedness (the number and pattern of linkages, or 
connections, among organizations) are the major structural 
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characteristics of environments that determine the 
interdependent relationship among organizations. Litwak and 
Rothman (1970) argue that a state of partial interdependence 
will lead the organizations to maintain linkages with others. 
Complete interdependence or no interdependence both tend to 
lead away from interorganizational linkages. 
Organizations also must be aware of their interdependency. 
If organizations are aware of the interdependence they have 
upon one another, they are more likely to cooperate with each 
other (Tropman, 1974; Rogers, 1984). Wells and Mulford (1983) 
found that mutual dependency is significantly correlated with 
all of the exchange activities they studied. However, Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) argue that the interdependent relationship 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of conflict. They 
contend that conflict is not possible without interdependence. 
If there is no connection between organizations, there is no 
basis for conflict. But, interdependence does not necessarily 
result in conflict if the interdependent organizations share 
similar preferences. 
If a state of interdependence is perceived by the 
organizations, they will develop cooperative interorganiza­
tional relations. This follows from the recognition that 
their goals cannot be achieved without the mutual support (in 
terras of resources and information) of each other. This is 
consistent with symbolic interactionism, which argues that 
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actors will present themselves in accordance with their 
definition of the situation. Also, they are assumed to be 
goal seeking and are seen to prefer some goals to others. 
They are capable of anticipating the outcomes of their 
actions, and directing their actions toward preferred 
anticipated outcomes (Wilson, 1983). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
HIS: Organizations that possess a high degree of perceived 
interdependence will be more likely to cooperate with 
other organizations. 
H16: Organizations that possess a high degree of perceived 
interdependence are less likely to engage in conflict. 
H17: Organizations which possess a high degree of perceived 
interdependence are more likely to engage in frequent 
contact other organizations. 
Perceived competition 
Perceived competition is the belief held by an organiza­
tion that its goal attainment will decrease as another 
organization increases its goal attainment (Paulson, 
1976:313). Based on the assumptions of exchange theory, Aiken 
and Hage (1968:915) note than in interorganizational 
relationships, organizations attempt to maximize gains and 
minimize losses. However, from the population ecology 
perspective on organization-environment relations. 
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organizations fail to flourish in certain environmental 
circumstances because others have successfully competed with 
them for essential resources. Therefore, as long as the 
resources which sustain organizations are finite and the 
populations (of organizations) have unlimited capacity to 
expand, competition must ensue (Hannan and Freeman, 1977:934). 
Hawley (1950:202) emphasizes competition as a determinant of 
the pattern of social organization. He maintains that "the 
action of all on the common supply gives rise to a reciprocal 
relation between each unit and all the others, if only from 
the fact that what one gets reduces by that amount what the 
others can obtain ... without this element of indirection, 
that is, unless units affect one another through affecting a 
common limited supply, competition does not exist." 
Therefore, the state of competition exists based on the 
assumptions that (1) resources available at any moment for 
each form of organization are finite and fixed (Hawley, 1950), 
(2) human communities have limited "capacities for organizing" 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), and (3) populations have an unlimited 
capacity to expand (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
In his empirical study, Paulson (1976) hypothesized that 
organizations engaging in competition are less likely to 
cooperate. However, he found no support for his hypothesis. 
What he found was that perceived competition is causally 
unrelated to perceived cooperative interaction. Instead, 
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perceived competition is more likely to lead to conflict 
because the greater the similarity of two resource limited 
competitors, the less likely it is that a single environment 
can support both of them in equilibrium, and the more likely 
that one will attempt to dominate or eliminate the other 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977:941). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated; 
H18; Organizations with high perceived competition are more 
likely to engage is conflict with others. 
H19; Organizations with high perceived competition are less 
likely to cooperate with others. 
H20; Organizations with high degree of perceived competition 
are less likely to engage in frequent contact. 
Frequency of contacts 
Frequency of contacts refers to the extent to which an 
organizations' boundary spanners perform exchange activities 
in the form of information or/and resource flows. Blau 
(1977:115-116) notes that certain structural conditions 
increase the opportunities for social contacts which, in turn, 
increase the probability of both social integration and 
conflict. In other words, social integration and conflict are 
both normal byproducts of social association and, therefore, 
vary directly with one another. In interorganizational 
networks, organizations may be linked directly or indirectly 
with one another by a specified type of relation. Van de Ven 
56 
and Ferry (1980:299) define the interorganizational network as 
"the total pattern of interrelationships among a cluster of 
organizations that are meshed together in a social system to 
attain a collective and self-interest goals or to resolve 
specific problems in a target population." Hall (1982) points 
out that interorganizational relations in an organization set 
are rather complex. Actually, a focal organization is not 
linked to only one set of organizations; it may, indeed, 
belong to several clusters of organizations for different 
purposes. In addition, interorganizational relations may be 
even more complex when a set of organizations maintains ties 
with several other sets of organizations. 
Hall (1982) indicates that the frequency of interactions 
among organizations in the set becomes an important factor in 
determining the types of interorganizational relations that 
organizations might develop. Based on his research on the 
social control system for problems associated with youth, he 
found that the frequency of interaction creates highly 
formalized or cooperative relations. At the same time, he 
also found the emergence of interorganizational conflict. 
Interestingly enough, he suggests that both interorganiza­
tional cooperation and conflict can be found in the same 
relationships of the involved organizations. This means that 
while organizations experience conflict over some activities, 
they may cooperate in others. Hall and associates (1978) 
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maintain that the frequency of interactions are related to 
high levels of both cooperation and conflict. The results 
from a study conducted by Geertsen and Madsen (1986) tends to 
reaffirm Blau's and Hall's arguments. Geertsen and Madsen 
found that interorganizational conflict, cooperation, and 
contact show moderately strong correlations. Therefore, the 
frequency of interactions can be related to both cooperation 
and conflict among the involved organizations in the same 
relationship. 
Based on the forgoing discussion, the following hypotheses 
can be developed; 
H21; The higher the frequency of interorganizational contact, 
the higher the cooperation. 
H22: The higher the frequency of interorganizational contact, 
the higher the conflict. 
> DOMAIN CONSENSUS' LOCAL DEPENDENCY-
COOPERATION 
fCONTAC^ GOAL SIMILARITY INTERDEPENDENCE^: 
< CONFLICT 
> COMPETITION AWARENESS 
Figure 2.1. The theoretical model of the interorganizational cooperation and 
conflict 
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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY 
The main focus of this chapter deals with the measurement 
of major concepts, sampling procedures, data-collecting tools, 
and the methods of data analysis. 
Samples 
Five major agricultural support organizations at the 
provincial level are purposively selected. Included were two 
rice research stations, a field-crop research center, the 
Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University, and the Office 
of Commerce, Khon Kaen province. Ten respondents from these 
five organizations were interviewed. 
Six districts out of a total of 20 districts in Khon Kaen 
province were chosen by simple random procedures to be 
included in the study. The selected districts were Banpai, 
Chumpae, Kranone, Maung, Nam-Pong, and Pol Districts. For 
each district, a complete listing of relevant agricultural 
support organizations were purposively selected. The number 
and types of the organizations chosen from each district are 
shown in Table 3.1. Almost 69 agricultural support 
organizations from the following categories were chosen, and 
117 respondents were interviewed. The number of respondents 
interviewed is presented in parentheses. 
The top managers of each of the organizations were 
interviewed. Efforts were also made to interview one or two 
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Table 3.1 Number and types of organizations by districts 
Types of 
Organi­
zations Ban-Pai Chumpae Kranone Maung Nam-Pong Pol Total 
Extension 
offices 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 6(18) 
Agri 
co-ops 1(3) 1(2) 1(2) 1(3) 1(3) 1(2) 6(15) 
Banks 3(6) 3(8) 3(7) 3(9) 3(9) 3(6) 18(45) 
Rice-mills 3(3) 3(3) 2(2) 4(4) 2(2) 3(3) 17(17) 
Independent 
retail 
business 3(3) 3(3) 3(3) 4(4) 6(6) 3(3) 22(22) 
Total 11(18) 11(19) 10(17) 13(23) 13(23) 11(17) 69(117) 
additional staff members in each organization that the access 
to the respondents was possible. A complete list of the 
organizations included in the study appears in Appendix 1. 
The additional staff members in each organization were 
interviewed in order to obtain more representative data about 
the organization. The conventional interorganizational 
relationship studies tend to interview only a key informant of 
the organization, e.g., the director of the agency. This 
raises the question about the representativeness of the data 
for the selected organization. Thus, interviewing several 
respondents from each organization hopefully provided more 
representative data. 
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General Characteristics of the Samples 
Almost 127 respondents from 74 organizations were 
interviewed. These respondents may hold a position ranging 
from the top manager, the head of subdivision, or the ordinary 
staff member of the selected organizations. Table 3.2 shows 
that the majority of the respondents are the top managers 
(58.3 percent), 24.4 percent are the heads of subdivision, and 
17.3 percent are the staff members. 
Based on the number of staff members, the Faculty of 
Agriculture is the largest organization at the provincial 
level. The field-crop research center and the rice research 
station (Maung District) are ranked second and third 
respectively. The Office of Commerce, can be considered as the 
smallest organization. Considering the educational background 
of the staff members, once again, the Faculty of Agriculture 
tends to possess the largest number of staff members in all 
categories of educational background. It is noticeable that 
only the Faculty of Agriculture and the field-crop research 
center have staff members with doctorate degrees (Table 3.3). 
Among the district organizations, the banks seem to be 
relatively larger than other types of organizations. Based on 
Table 3.3, the average number of full-time staff members for 
the banks is 17.7 (N=18) while that for the six extension 
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Table- 3.2. Position of respondents in the selected 
organizations 
Position Number Percent 
Top manager 74 58.3 
Head of subdivision 31 24.4 
Ordinary staff 22 17.3 
TOTAL 127 100.0 
Table 3.3. Organization's stafif members with educational background 
Organization 
Educational Background Number of staff 
Full- Elementary High 
time Temporary School School College B.A. M.A. Ph.D. 
Provincial level: (N=!>) 
Rice research 
station (Maung 
District) 48 75 95 11 
Rice research 
station (Chumpae 
District) 16 25 
Field-crop 
research center 72 131 
Faculty of 
Agriculture 501 16 
Office of 
Commerce 14 -
28 
68 
180 143 47 
10 
21 
37 
5 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Number • of staff Educational Background 
Organization 
Full-
t ime Temporary 
Elementary 
School 
High 
School College B.A. M.A. Ph.D• 
District Level:^ (N 1=69) 
The Extension 
Offices (N=6) 15. 6 1.3 1.7 - 13.0 2.2 
The Agri Coops 
(N=6) 6.0 0. 5 0.5 0. 3 4.9 .8 — — 
The Banks (N=18) 17.7 0.06 0.6 1.9 8.0 7.2 .1 
The Rice-mills 
(N=17) 14. 9 13. 7 27.0 .7 . 5 .4 -
The Retail 
Businesses (N=22) 4.0 0. 6 3. 3 .7 . 5 . 1 — — 
®The average number of staffs with educational background is presented for each 
category of district-organizations. 
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offices is 15.6. the retail businesses and agricultural 
cooperatives seem to have the smallest average number of 
full-time staff members, 4.0 (N=22), 6.0 (N=6) respectively. 
The rice-mills tend to hire the highest number of temporary 
staff members; their average number of temporary staff is 13.7 
(N=17). 
The educational background of staff members tends to vary 
according to type of organization. The staff members of the 
rice mills and the retail businesses tend to have lower 
educational background than those in the other types of 
organization. The majority of staff in these two types of 
organizations finished only elementary school level while 
those in the banks, the extension offices, and the 
agricultural cooperatives mostly finished college or 
university with a bachelor's degree. Notice that no district 
organizations have the staff members with doctorate degrees 
and only the banks have staff members with a master's degree 
(.10). 
The organizations included in this study may provide 
several kinds of services to the area's farmers. Table 3.4 
presents the types of services provided by the agricultural 
support organizations. Research is conducted primarily by the 
Faculty of Agriculture, the rice and field crop research 
stations, and the Office of Commerce. Interestingly enough. 
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Table 3.4. Number of organizations and their services 
provided (N=74). 
Services Provided^ 
Number of 
organizations 
(N=74) Percent 
Conducting research 6 8.1 
Providing agricultural information 34 45.9 
Providing agricultural marketing 
and price information 19 25. 7 
Selling fertilizer 27 36.5 
Selling insecticide 8 10.8 
Selling herbicide 20 27.0 
Selling seed 25 33.8 
Providing credit and loans 28 37.8 
Buying agricultural products 17 23.0 
^One organization may provide several types of services. 
some banks/ e.g., the Thai Farmer Bank, LOT., have their own 
research programs. 
There are 34 organizations which provide information 
concerning agricultural technology and 19 organizations which 
supply information about marketing and the prices of 
agricultural products to farmers. These two functions are 
performed by the extension offices, the Office of Commerce, 
the retail-businesses, the agricultural cooperatives, and the 
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rice-mills. The independent retail businesses dominate the 
marketing and the selling of farm inputs subsidies. The 
agricultural cooperatives tend to play a nonsignificant role 
relative to this function except in the marketing of 
fertilizer. 
Credit and loans are obtained mostly from the banks and 
the agricultural cooperatives. However, the independent 
retail businesses and the rice-mills may also perform this 
function. 
Buying agricultural products seem to be monopolized by the 
rice-mills. Agricultural cooperatives tend to be less 
competitive in this area. 
Table 3.5 presents information on the management styles, 
the type of decision making structures, and the presence and 
absence of written regulations of the sampled organizations. 
Based upon Table 3.5, 50 percent of the organizations' 
managers prefer working with moderate cooperation from other 
organizations. Only five organizations prefer working with 
full cooperation. Managers from 31 organizations report that 
they prefer to work alone without any intervention from the 
outside. As far as the decision-making structure is 
concerned, the overwhelming majority of the selected 
organizations (67 organizations) have a manager who acts as a 
decision-maker for all matters of the organization. In only 
six organizations were the decisions made by committees. 
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Table 3.5. Management style, forms of decision authority, and 
formally written regulations (N=74) 
Number of 
Organizations Percent 
Management style: 
Prefer working alone 
Prefer working with moderate 
cooperation from other 
organizations 
Prefer working with full 
cooperation from other 
organizations 
TOTAL 
31 
37 
_6 
74 
41.9 
50.0 
8 . 1  
1 0 0 . 0  
Forms of decision authority: 
The manager makes most of the 
decisions 
The committee makes most of the 
decisions 
TOTAL 
67 90.5 
9.5 
Formally written regulations 
Exist 
Do not exist 
TOTAL 
35 
39 
74 
52.7 
1 0 0 . 0  
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Over 50 percent of the organizations have no formal set of 
regulations. In these organizations, rules are tendered by 
the manager based upon his/her personal judgment. This kind 
of practice is prévalant among the rice-mills and the 
independent retail businesses. 
Data Collection 
Questionnaire construction and administering 
A questionnaire containing the measurement of the concepts 
in the model proposed in Chapter II was developed and used to 
collect data in a face-to-face interview situation. A 
complete list of the questions appearing in the questionnaire 
is presented in Appendix 2. 
The items in the questionnaire come from two sources. 
Some questions were borrowed from other studies which deal 
with the issue of interorganizational relationships whereas 
others were developed by the author. Specifically, the 
questions associated with the measurement of domain consensus 
and conflict were adapted from those used in Paulson's (1976) 
study. 
The questions which were designed to measure the concept 
"awareness" were borrowed from the study of Van de Ven and 
Ferry (1980). The questions associated with the frequency of 
contacts and cooperation were borrowed from Hall and 
associate's (1977) and Vfhetten and Szwa j kowski ' s (1978) 
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studies, respectively. The remaining questions were developed 
by the author. 
The questionnaire, which was originally prepared in 
English, was translated into Thai, the native and official 
language of Thailand. Each respondent was interviewed by two 
interviewers in a face-to-face interview situation. The 
interview session took approximately two hours to complete. 
The questionnaires were edited daily at the end of the day. 
Measurement of Major Concepts 
Based upon the model proposed in Chapter 2, there are 
seven independent variables (goal similarity, local 
dependency, awareness, perceived interdependence, domain 
consensus, perceived competition, interorganizational contact) 
and two dependent variables (cooperation and conflict). The 
measurement of these concepts follow: 
Independent Variables 
1) Local Dependency was measured by the respondents 
indicating the extent to which their organizations depend 
upon local facilities, services, and cooperation. The 
following two questions were asked: 
- To what extent do you think that the success of your 
organization depends on facilities and services received 
from — (specified organizations)? 
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- To what extent do you think that the effective 
provision of services to your clients depends on the 
cooperation of — (specified organizations)? 
Scale: 1 - To no extent 
2 - Little extent 
3 - Somewhat extent 
4 - Considerable extent 
5 - Great extent 
The scores of the two dimensions of local dependency are 
combined to create an indicator, LOCDEP (XI), of the 
latter variable — local dependency. A reliability 
coefficient (alpha) of .72 was obtained for the two item 
scale. 
2) Goal similarity (G0LS:X2) was measured by asking the 
respondents to indicate the extent to which their 
organization's goals are similar to those of their 
counterparts. If their goals are perceived as completely 
different, a score of 1 was recorded. If they perceived 
that their goals are similar, but not identical, a score 
of 2 was recorded. If their goals were perceived as 
completely the same the score of 3 was recorded. 
3) Awareness is measured by the extent to which the 
respondents are knowledgeable about the services and staff 
members of other organizations. The respondents were 
asked to answer the following questions: 
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- How well do you know about the services provided by — 
(specified organizations)? 
- How well acquainted ace you with staff members of — 
(specified organizations)? 
Scale: 1 - Not at all 
2 - Not very well 
3 - Somewhat well 
4 - Quite well 
5 - Very well 
The scores of the two items were added to create an 
indicator, AWANESS (X3).. for this concept. The 
reliability test shows the reliability coefficients 
(alpha) at .83 for the two items. 
Domain consensus is the extent to which a pair of 
organizations accept the participation of the other in the 
agricultural development project. The following question 
was used to top this dimension; 
- To what extent do you think that — (specified 
organizations) should become involved in a program 
designed to diffuse agricultural technology to farmers? 
Scale: 1 - Definitely should not 
2 - Not certain 
3 - Definitely should 
DOMCON (Yl) is created on the basis of the responses to 
this single item. 
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Perceived interdependence was measured by the extent to 
which other organizations are perceived by the respondents 
as important to the accomplishment of their organization's 
goals and to the fulfillment of their client's needs. The 
respondents were asked to answer the following questions; 
- To what extent does working with — (specified 
organizations) lead to the accomplishment of your 
organization's goals? (GOLAC) 
- To what extent does working with — (specified 
organizations) lead to the fulfillment of your client's 
needs? (CLIS) 
Scale: 1 - To no extent 
2 - Little extent 
3 - Some extent 
4 - Considerable extent 
5 - Great extent 
Each item was used as an indicator of perceived inter­
dependence. Thus, this concept was a composite measure 
based on the two indicators, GOLAC (Y2) and CLIS (Y3). 
Perce ived competition was measured by the amount of 
competition experienced in obtaining resources and in 
providing services to clients. The respondents were asked 
to answer the following questions, each of which was used 
as an indicator of the overall concept. 
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- To what extent does your organization have to compete 
with — (specified organizations) in obtaining resources 
(e.g., funding, personnel)? (C0MPT:Y4) 
- To what extent do — (specified organizations) compete 
with your organization for providing services to clients? 
(C0MPET:Y5) 
Scale: 1 - To no extent 
2 - Little extent 
3 - Some extent 
4 - Considerable extent 
5 - Great extent 
Frequency of contacts was measured simply by ascertaining 
the actual amount of interorganizational contact. The 
indicator, CONTACT (Y6), was developed based on the answer 
of the respondents to the following question. 
- To what extent is your organization in contact with — 
(specified organizations) for the purpose of discussing 
issues of mutual concern? 
Scale: 1 - Very little/None 
2 - Little 
3 - Some amount 
4 - Much 
5 - A great deal 
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Dependent variables 
1) Cooperation was indicated by the respondent's perception 
of the overall cooperation they received from other 
organizations and the extent to which organizations refer 
clients to one another. Two indicators, COOP (Y7) and 
CLCOOP {Y8), were developed based on the following two 
questions : 
- How much cooperation does your organization receive from 
- (specified organizations)? (COOP) 
- To what extent does your organization and — (specified 
organizations) refer clients to each other? (CLCOOP) 
Scale: 1 - Very little/None 
2 - Little 
3 - Some extent 
4 - Much 
5 - Very much 
2) Conflict was measured by asking the respondents to 
indicate whether or not they have disagreements or 
conflicts over the means used to implement agricultural 
development programs. Conflict is measured by two 
indicators, CONFLI (Y9) and CONFME (YlO), which were based 
on the respondent's answers to the following questions: 
- To what extent do disagreements or disputes characterize 
the relations between your organization and — (specified 
organizations)? (CONFLI) 
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- To what extent do disagreements or disputes over the 
means used to implement agricultural development 
activities characterize the relations between your 
organization and — (specified organizations).? (CONFME) 
Scale; 1 - Very little/None 
2 - Little 
3 - Some extent 
4 - Considerable extent 
5 - Great extent 
Figure 3.1 presents a model demonstrating the 
relationships of latent variables and their measures. 
Data Analysis 
The unit of analysis 
A pair of organizations (a dyad) is the unit of analysis 
used in this study. A dyadic score for each measure of the 
concept was created by adding the scores given by the managers 
of both organizations. Only the scores of those who are 
knowledgeable about one another were used to create a dyadic 
score. For example, a dyadic score of the interorganizational 
conflict between the extension office and the research station 
was calculated by adding the perceived conflict score given by 
both organizations. With possible scores from 1 (the lowest 
conflict) to 5 (the highest conflict), the extension office 
might rate its level of conflict with the research station 
> DOMAIN CONSENSUS: LOCAL DEPENDI3NCY 
COOPERATION 
CONTAC >INTERDEPENDENCE GOAL SIMILARITY 
CONFLICT 
•> COMPETITION AWARENESS 
YlO 
Figure 3.1. A theoretical model of interorganizational cooperation 
and conflict with the indicators of major concepts 
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equal to 4, and the research station gives a score of 3 to 
indicate the extent of conflict it has with the extension 
office. The resulting dyadic score of conflict between these 
two organizations is 7. Note that the possible dyadic score 
for this case ranges from 2 to 10. This procedure has been 
used in several interorganizational studies, e.g.. Van de Ven 
and Ferry (1980); Mulford (1980); Zober (1979). 
A question might be raised as to why only the score of the 
top manager was used to create a dyadic score. There are 
essentially two reasons. Firstly, data from the interviews 
with the managers of all sampled organizations are complete. 
As mentioned in the sample section, efforts were made to 
interview additional staff members in each organization, but 
the access to these respondents in some organizations was 
impossible. Therefore, the dyadic score based on several 
respondents from each organization can not be accomplished due 
to the inconsistent number of respondents across the 
organizations. Secondly, using a key informant is consistent 
with the typical approach used in interorganizational studies, 
e.g., Aiken and Hage (1967); Hall et al. (1977) which 
generally collect the data from a single key respondent, e.g., 
the organization's director. Morrissey et al. (1982) reported 
that more than 60% of the measures they reviewed from 35 
studies are based on data collected from key informants. 
However, the author realizes the disadvantages of using a 
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single key informant. As Morrissey suggested, an agency 
director may be knowledgeable about the policy aspects of 
interorganizational interactions but may be a poor respondent 
for the information about the routine or day-to-day 
transactions. For this study, the disadvantages may be 
minimized due to the fact that most organizations are small, 
having centralized decision-making structures. Thus, it is 
anticipated that the top managers are the single most 
knowledgeable source about interorganizational transactions. 
Based on the criteria set above, 126 dyads were created 
among the relationships of organizations at the provincial and 
local levels, (henceforth, referred to as Group 1 
organizations, or Group 1), and 326 dyads are created out of 
the relationships of the organizations at the district level 
(henceforth, referred to as Group 2 organizations, or Group 
2). The number of dyads was treated as the sample size for 
each group. 
Data analysis procedures 
The mean values of responses for the items used to create 
the indicators of all variables in the proposed model were 
calculated. These mean values were computed based on the 
responses of the top manager, the head of subdivision, and the 
ordinary staff member of each sampled organization. Mean 
values were used to explain the overall relationships among 
the selected organizations. 
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The dyadic scores are entered into a LISREL (Linear 
Structural Relationships) model to evaluate the theoretical 
model and to test the hypotheses. 
LISREL can be used for the evaluation of a causal model 
with multiple indicators of latent variables, reciprocal 
causation, measurement errors, correlated errors, and 
correlated residuals (Pedhazur, 1982). It consists of two 
major subdivisions: the structural equation model and the 
measurement model (Figure 3.2). The structural equation model 
shows the relations among exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Most variables in the structural equation model are 
unobserved, or latent variables. Specifically, the structural 
equation model of this study will include the relations among 
latent variables which include goal-similarity, local 
dependency, awareness, perceived interdependence, domain 
consensus, perceived competition, frequency of contacts, 
cooperation, and conflict. The statistical notations for 
latent dependent, or endogenous, variables are designated as n 
(eta), and latent independent, or exogenous, variables are 
designated as ç (xi). Statistically, the structural equation 
model can be presented as: 
gn = rg + c 
g (beta) represents the matrix of coefficients of the 
effects of endogenous on endogenous variables. 
->Xl 
> DOMAIN CONSENSUS: LOCAL DEPENDENCY 
COOPERATION 
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Figure 3.2. Measurement model of interorganizational cooperation and 
conflict to be tested across organization groups 
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r (gamma) is the matrix of coefficients of the effects of 
exogenous variables on endogenous variables. 
Ç (zeta) is the vector of residuals in the equations. 
The measurement model represents the relations between latent 
and observed variables (the indicators). This model is 
divided into two parts: (1) the relations between the 
unobserved dependent variables and their measures, which is 
contained within the following equation. 
y = Ayti + e 
where 
y is a vector of the measures of the dependent variables 
A. (lambda) is a matrix of coefficients, or loadings of y 
on the unobserved variables (n) 
e (epsilon) is a vector of errors in the measurement of y 
(2) the relations between the unobserved independent variables 
(ç) and their measures (x). Their relations can be 
symbolically represented by the following equation; 
X = + 6 
where 
X is a vector of the measures of the independent variables 
A (lambda) is a matrix of coefficients, or loadings, of x 
on the unobserved independent variables (ç) 
Ô (delta) is a vector of errors in the measurement of x. 
The computer program, LISRELIV; developed by Joreskog and 
Sorbom (1983) has been used to estimate the parameters in the 
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model. For this analysis, the model and hypothesis are 
evaluated and tested for two samples separately. The first 
sample contains organizations at both the provincial and the 
district levels. The second group involves only those 
organizations at the district level. These two groups will be 
referred to as Group 1 and Group 2 respectively in Chapter IV 
and V. Note that a covariance matrix of each group is used in 
the computer program to estimate the parameters in the model. 
Covariance matrices of both groups are presented in Appendix 
3. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 
This chapter will be divided into two parts. In part one, 
a description of the interorganizational relations among 
agricultural support organizations will be made. Hypothesis 
and model testing will be discussed in the second part of the 
chapter. 
A Description of the Interorganizational Relations Among 
Agricultural Support Organizations at the 
Provincial and Local Levels 
Provincial level 
The perception of a focal organization about other 
functionally and geographically contingent organizations is 
crucial to the behaviors and strategies it develops to 
accomplish interorganizational relations. In this section, 
the mean values reflecting the organization's perception of 
local dependency, goal similarity, awareness of other 
organizations, interdependency, competition, domain consensus, 
frequency of contacts, cooperation and conflict were 
presented. The mean values were computed for each variable 
based on the responses of the respondents from the five 
organizations at the provincial level. 
Table 4.1 presents the mean values for three of the major 
independent variables calculated for those organizations at 
the provincial level. Based upon these data, it appears that 
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Table 4.1. Mean values of awareness, perceived local 
dependency, and perceived goal similarity among 
agricultural support organizations at the 
provincial level 
Research Faculty of Office of 
Station Agriculture Commerce 
AWARENESS^ 
1. The extent to which an 
organization is knowl­
edgeable about the 
services provided by 
other organizations 
2. The extent to which an 
organization is ac­
quainted with the staff 
members o'' other 
organizations 
GOAL SIMILARITY^ 
3. The extent to which the 
goals are perceived to 
be similar to those of 
other organizations 
LOCAL DEPENDENCY^ 
4. The extent to which an 
organization depends on 
facilities and services 
from other local 
organizations 
5. The extent of dependence 
on the cooperation of 
other local organizations 
to increase the 
efficiency of the service 
system 
3.7 3.9 2.9 
2.8 3.4 1.2 
1.9 1.1 1.0 
4.0 3.7 4.0 
4.0 3.6 4.0 
^Scale; 1 = Not at all; 2 = Little extent; 3 = Some 
extent; 4 = Considerable extent; 5 = Great extent. 
^"Scale: 1 = Completely different; 2 = Similar, but not 
identical; 3 = Completely the same. 
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the organizations are more or less knowledgeable about the 
services provided by the other organizations at this level. 
They tend to be slightly more aware of the services provided 
by the Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University than about 
the function of the research stations and the Office of 
Commerce. As far as an acquaintance with other organizations' 
staff members is concerned, again, they tend to be most well 
acquainted with the staff members of the Faculty of 
Agriculture (x = 3.4), members of Faculty of Agriculture (x = 
3.4) followed by those at the research station (x = 2.8) and 
the Office of Commerce (x = 1.2). On the average, it appears 
that these provincial-level organizations are well acquainted 
with the staff members of other organizations (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 also presents data on the extent to which 
organizations perceive their goals as being similar to those 
of other organizations at the provincial level. Generally, 
organizations at the provincial level perceive little overlap 
between their goals and those of the other organizations in 
the study. Specifically, they tend to see their goals as 
totally different from those of the Office of Commerce (x = 
1.0), but are more likely to see their goals as being similar 
to those of the research stations (x = 1.9). 
As far as local resource dependency is concerned, the mean 
values were computed based on the responses of the top manager 
of each organization. Most provincial-level organizations 
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perceive that they are highly dependent on local services and 
coordination with other local organizations. This holds 
especially true for the research stations and the Office of 
Commerce which report slightly higher degrees of local 
dependency than the Faculty of Agriculture (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.2 presents the mean values for interdependence, 
domain consensus, and competition as calculated for those 
organizations at the provincial level. The table shows that 
most organizations perceive the existence of a moderate degree 
of organizational interdependence. They sesm to perceive a 
higher level of interdependence with the Faculty of 
Agriculture than with either the research stations or the 
Office of Commerce in terms of both the accomplishment of 
organizational goals and the fulfillment of clients' needs. 
As a general rule, they perceive a higher level of 
interdependence when interdependence is viewed as the 
accomplishment of organizational goals than when it is 
perceived as the fulfillment of clients' needs. For example, 
both the Office of Commerce and the research stations are 
perceived to be more important in serving organizational goals 
accomplishment (x = 2.0, 3.0, respectively) than in the 
fulfillment of clients' needs (x = 1.9; 2.6, respectively). 
Table 4.2 also presents the mean values for domain 
consensus, or the extent to which organizations are accepted 
as participants in the diffusion of agricultural technology. 
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Table 4.2. Mean values of the perceived interdependence, the 
acceptance, and the competition among agricultural 
support organizations at the provincial level 
Research Faculty of Office of 
Stations Agriculture Commerce 
INTERDEPENDENCE^ 
1. the accomplishment of 
the organization's 
goals 
2. the fulfillment of 
clients' needs 
DOMAIN CONSENSUS*^ 
3. the acceptance of other 
organizations to 
participate in a program 
designed to diffuse 
agricultural technology 
to the farmers 
COMPETITION^ 
4. competition for needed 
resources (e.g., funding 
personnel) 
5. competition in providing 
services to clients 
3.0 3.7 2.0 
2.6 3.3 1.9 
3.0 3.0 3.0 
1.5 1.1 1.0 
1.4 1.7 1.0 
^Scaler 1 = To no extent; 2 = Little extent; 3 = Some 
extent; 4 = Considerable extent; 5 = Great extent. 
^'Scale: 1 = Definitely should not; 2 = Not certain; 3 = 
Definitely should. 
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All respondents agree that the organizations contained in the 
study have a legitimate role to play in a program designed to 
diffuse agricultural technology to farmers. In fact, the mean 
value (x = 3.0) represents the maximum level of domain 
consensus for all three organizations. At the general level, 
these scores represent a universal and reciprocal acceptance 
of the three types of organizations and the roles they play in 
agricultural development programs. It should be cautioned, 
however, that this general agreement might break down when 
actual issues of resource distribution or decision-making are 
examined. 
Competition among the provincial level organizations is 
very limited (Table 4.2). Respondents report a relatively low 
level of competition with the research stations, the Faculty 
of Agriculture, and the Office of Commerce for needed 
resources and for providing services to the clients. 
Comparatively, the research stations are perceived by the 
members of the other two organizations as the leading 
competitor in obtaining resources and funding. On the other 
hand, the Faculty of Agriculture is perceived to be the 
leading competitor when it comes to providing services to 
clients (x = 1.7). Neither the research stations nor the 
Faculty of Agriculture report that they are in direct 
competition with the Office of Commerce in providing services 
for clients or in securing needed resources. 
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Table 4.3. Mean values of the frequency of 
interorganizational contacts, cooperation and 
conflict among agricultural support organizations 
at the provincial level 
Research Faculty of Office of 
Station Agriculture Commerce 
COOPERATION^ 
1. Perceived cooperation 
received from other 
organizations 3.3 4.0 2.1 
2. Cooperation in terms 
of client reference 1.7 1.9 1.0 
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT^ 
Frequency of contacts 
other organizations for 
the purpose of discussing 
issues of mutual concern 2.7 3.3 1.2 
CONFLICT^ 
4. Perceived conflict with 
other organization 1.3 1.4 1.0 
5. Perceived conflict over 
the means of technology 
transfers 1.4 1.3 1.7 
^Scale: 1 = Very little/None; 2 = Little; 3 = Some 
amount; 4 = Much; 5 = A great deal. 
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Table 4.3 contains the mean levels for the final three 
variables in the analysis, frequency of contacts, cooperation, 
and conflict. Again, these values are computed for the 
organizations at the provincial level. Based on the figures 
in Table 4.3, the Faculty of Agriculture is reported to have 
more extensive contacts with other organizations (x =3.3) 
for the purpose of discussing issues of mutual concern than do 
either the research stations or the Office of Commerce, with 
mean values of 2.7 and 1.2 respectively. Obviously, the 
Office of Commerce is less likely to be contacted by the other 
two types of organizations. 
Organizations at this level seem to perceive cooperation 
they receive from other organizations differently. It is 
obvious that both the research stations and the Office of 
Commerce perceive a great deal of cooperation seminating from 
the Faculty of Agriculture (x = 4.0). The research stations 
are perceived by the other organizations as being somewhat 
cooperative (x = 3.3) while the Office of Commerce is 
perceived as being the least cooperative of the three (x = 
2.1). Another form of interorganizational cooperation comes 
in the form of client referai, a network which attempts to 
maximize information flow to the individual farm operation. 
The data in Table 4.3 demonstrate that most of the 
provincial-level organizations report very limited client 
referai to the other organizations. The Faculty of 
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Agriculture (x = 1.9) and the research stations (x = 1.7) 
receive referais more than the Office of Commerce (x = 1.0). 
Generally, the organizations at the provincial level 
report low level of conflict with one another. Comparatively, 
a slightly higher level of conflict is reported in dealing 
with the Faculty of Agriculture (x = 1.4) than with the 
research station (x = 1.3). As far as a conflict over the 
means is concerned, both the research stations and the Faculty 
of Agriculture express slight disagreement with the methods 
used by the Office of Commerce in the process of technology; 
the mean value for the Office of Commerce is slightly higher 
than that expressed for the other two types of organizations 
(Table 4.3). 
The district level 
At the district (local) level, 69 agricultural support 
organizations are categorized into five groups for ease of 
presentation: the extension offices, the agricultural 
cooperatives, the banks, the independent retail businesses, 
and the rice-mills. 
Mean values were computed based on the responses of 117 
respondents from 69 district level organizations. Table 4.4 
presents the mean values for three of the major independent 
variables calculated for the five categories of organizations 
at the district level. The figures related to the level of 
interorganizational awareness at the local level seem to 
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Table 4.4. Mean values of awareness, perceived local 
dependency, and perceived goal similarity among 
agricultural support organizations at the district 
level 
Extension Agri Rice- Retail 
Office Coop Bank Mill Business 
AWARENESS* 
1. The extent to which 
an organization is 
knowledgeable about 
the services provided 
provided by other 
organizations 
2. The extent to which 
an organization is 
acquainted with the 
staff members of 
other organizations 
GOAL SIMILARITY^ 
3. The extent to which 
the goals are 
perceived to be 
similar to those of 
other organizations 
LOCAL DEPENDENCY* 
4. The extent to which 
an organization 
depends on facilities 
and services from 
other local 
organizations 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.3 
5. The extent of 
dependence on the 
cooperation of other 
local organizations 
to increase the 
efficiency of the 
service system 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.3 
3. 3 3. 3 3.8 3.6 3.3 
2.7 2. 5 3. 0 2.7 2.4 
1.1 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2 
*Scale: 1 = Not at all; 2 = Little extent; 3 = Some 
extent; 4 = Considerable extent; 5 = Great extent. 
Scale; 1 = Completely different; 2 = Similar, but not 
identical; 3 = Completely the same. 
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indicate that most of the agricultural support organizations 
at this level are moderately knowledgeable about the other 
organizations' services. The highest levels of awareness 
occur relative to the services of the banks (x = 3.8) and the 
rice-mills (x = 3.6) when compared to the levels reported for 
the extension offices, the agricultural cooperatives, and the 
independent retail businesses. 
The findings related to another type of awareness, 
familiarity with the staffs of other organizations are also 
reported in Table 4.4. Generally, lower level of awareness 
are apparent when measured in this way. Bank personnel are 
the most visible (x = 3.0), followed by employees of the 
rice-mills (x = 2.7) and extension offices (x = 2.7). The 
least visible personnel are those employed in the retail 
business (x = 2.4) and the agricultural cooperatives (x = 
2.5). The fact that most organizations have to depend upon 
the services provided by the banks might account for their 
relatively high visibility. 
Table 4.4 also contains findings related to goal 
similarity. The extent to which organizations perceive that 
their goals are similar to those of other organizations is one 
of the primary factors in accounting for the nature and extent 
of interorganizational relations. In general, the results on 
goal similarity in Table 4.4 show that organizations tend to 
differentiate their goals from others in the agricultural 
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sector. The mean values for the banks (x = 1.5) and the 
agricultural cooperatives (x = 1.4) are slightly higher than 
those of the other types of organizations. By and large, the 
findings tend to underscore the fact that there is little 
perceived similarity in the goals of these local 
organizations. 
Based on the data in Table 4.4, it appears that all groups 
of agricultural support organizations perceive an average to 
an above average level of local dependency. Note that the 
mean values for local dependency were computed differently 
from those for the rest of variables. Only the responses of 
the top manager from 69 organizations were included in the 
computation. With respect to local services and facilities, 
the extension offices and the rice-mills express slightly 
higher levels of dependence (x = 3.4) when compared with the 
rest of the organizations. Among all the types of 
organizations, the banks express the lowest degree of local 
service dependence (x = 2.9). 
X'Jhsn considering the link between cooperation and 
efficiency of the service system, organizations at this level 
seem to attach an average to an above average importance to 
local dependency (Table 4.4). Even though all organizations 
express the importance of a moderate level of dependency on 
local cooperation, the extension offices and the agricultural 
cooperatives tend to attach a slightly higher degree of 
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importance to local dependency compared with rest of 
organizations. 
Table 4.5 deals with the perceptions of interdependence, 
domain consensus, and competition among the local network of 
agricultural support organizations. In terms of perceived 
interdependence, all types of organizations report a low to 
average degree of interdependence. The highest level of 
perceived interdependence occurs with the banks. They are 
perceived to be of moderate importance in the accomplishment 
of organizational goals (x = 2.7) and for the fulfillment of 
clients' needs (x = 2.5). 
With respect to domain consensus, extension offices and 
agricultural cooperatives are the most likely to be seen as 
having a legitimate role to play in programs designed to 
diffuse agricultural technology to farmers (x = 3.0 and 2.8 
respectively). The picture is much less clear on the role 
played by the banks, the rice-mills, and the independent 
retail businesses. The relatively low rankings assigned to 
these organizations might indicate a feeling of suspicion 
about the potential of these private organizations to 
contribute to this kind of program. Private organizations 
tend to be perceived as benefit-oriented organizations which 
are contrary to the public image of the extension offices and 
agricultural cooperatives. 
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Table 4.5. Mean values of perceived interdependencef domain 
consensus, and competition among agricultural 
support organizations at one district level 
Extension Agri Rice- Retail 
Office Coop Bank Mill Business 
INTERDEPENDENCE^ 
1. the accomplishment of 
the organization's 
goals 2.4 2. 2 2.7 2. 1 2.0 
2. the fulfillment of 
clients' needs 2.2 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.8 
DOMAIN CONSENSUS^ 
3. the acceptance of 
other organizations 
to participate in a 
program designed to 
diffuse agricultural 
technology to the 
farmers 3.0 2.8 2. 5 2.1 2.1 
COMPETITION® 
4. competition for 
needed resources 
(e.g., funding 
personnel) 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 
5. competition in 
providing services 
to clients 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.4 1.3 
^Scale; 1 = To no extent; 2 = Little extent; 3 = Some 
extent; 4 = Considerable extent; 5 = Great extent. 
^Scaler 1 = Definitely should not; 2 = Not certain; 3 = 
Definitely should. 
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Table 4.5 supports a picture of limited competition among 
the local agricultural support organizations. Mean values 
from Table 4.5 indicate that the banks are perceived to be 
more competitive than the other types of organizations with 
regard to competition for resources, e.g., funding, personnel 
(x = 1.7) and competition in providing services to clients (x 
= 2.1). Next to the banks, agricultural cooperatives, 
extension offices, and rice-mills (x = 1.4, 1.3, 1.4 
respectively) are seen as the next most competitive 
organizations with respect to resources, followed by 
independent retail businesses (x = 1.2). For competition in 
providing services to clients, agricultural cooperatives are 
viewed as more competitive than either the rice-mills or the 
independent retail businesses (x = 1.7, 1.4, 1.3 
respectively), with extension offices perceived as the least 
competitive organizations along this dimension (x = 1.2). 
Table 4.6 presents responses about the freqency of 
interorganizational contacts, cooperation, and conflict among 
agricultural support agencies at the district level. From the 
table, it appears that agricultural support organizations 
engage in rather limited contact with one another to discuss 
issues of mutual concern. The organizations most frequently 
contacted were the banks (x = 2.2) slightly more than the 
extension offices (x = 2.0) and the agricultural cooperatives 
(X = 2.0). Very low level of contact were reported for the 
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Table 4.6. Mean values of the frequency of 
interorganizational contacts, cooperation and 
conflict among agricultural support organizations 
at the district level 
Extension Agri Rice- Retail 
Office Coop Bank Mill Business 
COOPERATION^ 
1. Perceived cooperation 
received from other 
organizations 2.8 
2 .  Cooperation in terms 
of client reference 2.3 
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT^ 
3. Frequency of contacts 
other organizations 
for the purpose of 
discussing issues of 
mutual concern 2.0 
CONFLICT^ 
4. Perceived conflict 
with other 
organizations 1.2 
5. Perceived conflict 
over the means of 
technology 
transfers 
2. 5 2.9 2. 1 1.9 
1.9 2.0 1.6 1.5 
2.0 2.2 1.7 1.6 
1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
1,6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 
^Scale: 1 = Very little/None; 2 = Little; 3 = Some 
amount; 4 = Much; 5 = A great deal. 
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rice-mills (x = 1.7) and the independent retail businesses (x 
= 1.6). 
With reference to overall levels of cooperation. Table 4.6 
paints a picture of relatively low interorganizational 
cooperation. Among those organizations seen as the most 
cooperative are the banks (x = 2.9) and the extension offices 
(x = 2.8). Those seen as the least cooperative are the 
indepenent retail businesses (x = 1.9). 
The findings on client reference patterns show a rather 
limited amount of client reference taking place among the 
organizations. However, client referai is greater for the 
extension offices (x = 2.3), the agricultural cooperatives (x 
= 1.9) and the banks (x = 2.0) than for the rice-mills (x = 
1.6) and the independent retail businesses (x = 1.5). 
It is interesting to note that the moderate to low level 
of cooperation are not necessarily associated with heightened 
conflict. The figures in Table 4.6 show that overall levels 
of conflict are quite low and differ very little among the 
organizational types. When conflict over the means is 
considered, a similar pattern of relatively low conflict is 
observed. î'Jhile there is some variation in perceived conflict 
among the organizations, the differences are certainly not 
large. 
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Hypothesis Testing and Model Evaluation 
The analysis reported in this section will be divided into 
three sections. Section I will deal with the testing of 
hypotheses by using the bivariate analysis. Sections II and 
III will be devoted to the testing of hypotheses and the 
evaluation of the theoretical model as it applies to 
interorganizational relations between the provincial and local 
levels (Group 1) and among organizations within thé local 
level (Group 2). 
Simple Bivariate Analysis 
The simple bivariate analysis examines the relationship 
between two variables. Pearson correlation coefficients (r) 
are used to demonstrate the direction and strength of the 
linear relationship. The positive or negative sign attached 
to the correlation coefficients indicates the direction of the 
covariation between the two variables. The purpose of 
bivariate analysis in this section is to discover whether or 
not the hypothesized relationships of the variables in the 
model are found to be supported. The hypotheses' will be 
supported if the p-values for the correlation coefficients are 
less than .05. Table 4.7 presents a complete summary of the 
correlation coefficients for each hypothesized relationship 
across both groups of organizations. 
The predicted positive relationships of local dependency 
with both domain consensus and perceived interdependence 
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Table 4.7. Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables 
in the measurement model, by hypothesis and 
organization group 
Relationship 
Organization Group 
Province-Local 
(Group 1) 
(N=126) 
Local 
(Group 2) 
(N=326) 
HI; 
LOCDEP/DOMCON ( + )' 13 .19 * * 
H2i 
LOCDED/GOLAC (+) 
LOCDEP/CLIS (+) 
.13 
.13 
.04 
. 15** 
H3: 
LOCDEP/COMPT (+) 
LOCDEP/COMPET {+) 
.07 
.07 
- . 0 2  
.06 
H4: 
GOLS/COOP (+) 
GOLS/CLOOP (+) 
.27** 
.42** 
. 1 2 *  
. 38** 
H5: 
GOLS/CONFLI (-) 
GOLS/CONFME (-) 
.23** 
.03 
.54** 
.15** 
H6: 
GOLS/DOMCON (+) 
H7: 
GOLS/GOLAC (+) 
GOLS/CLIS (+) 
.30** 
. 2 6 * *  
. 12*  
.16** 
H8: 
GOLS/COMPT (+) 
GOLS/COMPET (+) 
.79** 
.43** 
.61** 
.73** 
(+) Indicates a predicted positive relationship while (-) 
indicates a predicted negative relationship between the 
variables. 
'p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
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Table 4.7. Continued 
Organization Group 
Province-Local Local 
(Group 1) (Group 2) 
Relationship (N=126) (N=326) 
H9: 
AWANESS/DOMCON (+) .14 -.03 
HIO; 
AWANESS/GOLAC (+) .25** .50** 
AWANESS/CLIS (+) .06 .30** 
Hll: 
AWANESS/COMPT (+) .15* .25** 
AWANESS/COMPET (+) .24** .39** 
H12: 
DOMCON/COOP (+) .24** .13** 
DOMCON/CLCOOP (+) -.01 .25** 
H13; 
DOMCON/CONFLI (-) -.08 .03 
DOMCON/CONFME (-) .01 .07 
H14: 
DOMCON/CONTACT (+) .11 .15** 
GOLAC/COOP (+) .66** .64** 
GOLAC/CLCOOP (+) .23** .27** 
CLIS/COOP (+) .67** .59** 
CLIS/CLCOOP (+) .19* .45** 
H16: 
GOLAC/CONFLI (-) .13 .26** 
GOLAC/CONFLI (-) .36** .06 
CLIS/CONFLI (-) .02 .30** 
CLIS/CONFME (-) .25** .25** 
H17: 
GOLAC/CONTACT (+) .59** .48** 
CLIS/CONTACT (+) .52** .56** 
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Table 4.7. Continued 
Organization Group 
Province-Local Local 
(Group 1) (Group 2) 
Relationship (N=12ô) (N=326) 
H18: 
COMPT/CONFLI (+) 
COMPT/CONFME (+) 
COMPET/CONFLI (+) 
COMPET/CONFME (+) 
H19: 
COMPT/COOP (-) 
COMPT/CLCOOP (-) 
COMPET/COOP (-) 
COMPET/CLCOOP (-) 
H20: 
COMPT/CONTACT (-) 
COMPET/CONTACT (-) 
H21: 
CONTACT/COOP (+) 
CONTACT/CLCOOP (+) 
H 2 2 :  
CONTACT/CONFLI (+) 
COMTACT/CONFME (+) 
.28** 
. 03 
.67** 
.40** 
51** 
29** 
54** 
37** 
.31** 
.39** 
.43** 
. 2 0 *  
.09* 
25** 
23** 
31** 
.47** 
. 52** 
46** 
51** 
.65** 
.59** 
.52** 
45** 
.27** ,47** 
31** 
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measured by CLIS are found to be supported for Group 2 
organizations. However, the hypothesized association with 
perceived competition (H3) is not totally confirmed due to the 
presence of negative correlation coefficients for a measure of 
competition in both groups. Notice also that the strength of 
the relationship is very low. Goal similarity shows a 
positive covariation with cooperation and conflict (except one 
negative r in group 1). Thus, H4 is fully supported, but H5 
is not. 
The hypothesized relationships between goal similarity and 
domain consensus, perceived interdependence, and perceived 
competition are all supported by the data (H7, H8), but the 
relationship with domain consensus not supported (H6). The 
relationship between awareness and domain consensus is not 
found to be supported by the data, but that the relationships 
between awareness and perceived interdependence, perceived 
competition are supported, except when perceived 
interdependence is measured by CLIS in Group 1. 
Domain consensus is positively associated with contact, as 
proposed (H14). Its relationship with cooperation is also 
supported for group 2, but not fully supported for group 1 
(H12). Domain consensus bears a positive relationship with 
conflict in group 2, but exhibits a mixed relationship in 
group 1. Thus, its hypothesized negative relationship with 
conflict is not found supported in either group (H13). 
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The hypothesized covariation of perceived interdependence 
with cooperation and contact is found supported (HIS, H17) 
while its hypothesized negative relationship with conflict is 
disconfirmed (H16). The opposite pattern is found in the 
relationship of perceived competition with cooperation, 
contact, and conflict. While the relationship of perceived 
competition with conflict is found supported (H18) with one 
exception in Group 1, its hypothesized negative association 
with cooperation and contact is not (H19, H20). As predicted, 
contact shows a positive relationship with cooperation and 
conflict for both groups (H21, H22). This finding seems to 
confirm Blau's argument that social interaction can be 
associated with both social integration and conflict. 
Interorganizational Relations Between Organizations 
at the Provincial Level and the Local Level (Group 1) 
Complete parameter estimates are reported in Figure 4.1. 
In testing the hypotheses, a t-value of two or larger can be 
used as a criterion to judge the statistical significance of 
the parameter estimates at the .05 level (Lewis-Beck, 1980). 
According to Joreskog and Sorbom (1983: III. 12), "Parameters 
whose t-values are larger than two in magnitude are normally 
judged to be (significantly) different from zero." In Figure 
4.1, one asterisk indicates a t-value of two to three while 
two asterisks denote a t-value of larger than three. 
Therefore, the hypotheses are supported when the relationship 
I 
1 /  
> DOMAIN CONSENSUS LOCAL DEPENDENCY 
COOPERATION 
V a  
CONTAC INTERDEPENDENCE OAL SIMILARITY 
'?6 
CONFLICT 
> COMPETITION 
Y4 Y5 
AWARENESS 
(3 
Yg Yio 
o 
Figure 4.1. LISREL estimates for the interorganizational cooperation and 
conflict among provincial and local organizations (Group 1) 
108 
of variables in the model is found to be statistically-
significant in the hypothesized direction. 
Organizations which depend on the services and cooperation 
of other organizations in their local area are more likely to 
explore the availability of services they need. They might 
also be expected to find out more about other organizations in 
order to promote the efficiency of their service delivery 
systems. Organizations often find themselves dependent upon 
each other. In order to protect their interests and to 
accomplish their goals, organizations have to adjust them­
selves to the interorganizational environment. In the local 
area, this means that organizations might have to accept the 
limitations imposed by other organizations in carrying out 
their combined function. In addition, they might find 
themselves competing with one another in providing services or 
in seeking needed resources. As hypothesized, the path 
coefficiences shown in Table 4.8 indicate that local 
dependency has a positive relationship with perceived inter­
dependence (0.149), domain consensus (0.132), and perceived 
competition (0.029), even though none of the relationships are 
statistically signigicant. 
Even though the relationships are not statistically 
significant, they are all consistent with the predicted 
direction. Thus, the relationships provide tentative support 
for the idea that organizations which are dependent on local 
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Table 4.8. The maximum likelihood of effects of exogenous 
variables on endogenous variables (gamma) 
Local Dependency Goal Similarity Awareness 
Domain consensus .132 .052 . 127 
Interdependence .149 .243** .181* 
Competition .029 .714** .133* 
Cooperation - -.379* -
Conflict - -.773* -
*Significant: t-value = 2.0 to 3.0. 
**Significant: t-value > 3.0. 
services and cooperation are more likely to perceive a state 
of mutual dependence and to develop domain consensus so that 
they can work together. However, they might also compete with 
one another for resources or in providing services. This 
occurs because they have the same target audiences, e.g., the 
farmers. 
The extent to which a pair of organizations perceive their 
goals as similar is expected to be related to perceived inter­
dependence, domain consensus, and perceived competition. The 
model provides general support for these hypothesized 
relations. The gamma values show that goal similarity is 
positively correlated with perceived interdependence (0.243), 
domain consensus (0.052), and perceived competition (0.714). 
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In addition, goal similarity significantly contributes to the 
variation of both perceived interdependence and perceived 
competition (see Table 4.8). Although the magnitude of the 
relationship between goal similarity and domain consensus is 
quite low and nonsignificant, the direction of the 
relationship is consistent with the hypothesis. 
Even though goal similarity can lead organizations into a 
state of both cooperation and conflict, organizations with 
similar goals were hypothesized to mor often engage in 
codperative than conflicting relationships. Based on the 
relationships reported in Table 4.8, goal similarity is 
negatively correlated with both cooperation (-0.378) and 
conflict (-0.773) and contributes significantly to the 
explained variation of these variables. It is interesting to 
note that the magnitude of the relationship between goal 
similarity and conflict is larger than its relationship with 
cooperation. Therefore, hypothesis 4 which predicted a 
positive relationship between goal similarity and cooperation 
is not supported but hypothesis 5 related to an inverse 
relation between goal similarity and conflict is fully 
supported. This means that goal similarity does not 
necessarily enhance the cooperation between organizations, but 
may actually decrease the extent of cooperation. 
Organizations perceiving their goals as being similar to 
those of others are less likely to engage in conflict. 
Ill 
However, goal similarity does not assure a state of 
cooperation, but it can prevent organizations from engaging in 
conflict. This finding is particularly meaningful when 
attempting to analyze the relationships between organizations 
at the provincial and the local level because of the 
differences in their administrative levels and constituencies. 
Even though these organizations may find their goals as 
similar, because of distance they may not have the chance to 
directly cooperate with one another. At the same time, goal 
similarity may mean that they are less likely to engage in 
conflict. 
Goal similarity also has an indirect effect on cooperation 
(0.614) and conflict (0.981) through the intervening variables 
of perceived interdependence, domain consensus, perceived 
competition, and contact. Its total effect on cooperation and 
conflict is 0.235 and 0.208 respectively (see Table 4.10). 
The hypothesized relationship of awareness and the three 
variables — perceived interdependence, domain consensus, and 
perceived competition — is supported. Awareness is 
positively correlated with all three variables. 
Comparatively, it has a stronger effect on perceived 
interdependence (0.181) than on perceived competition (0.133) 
and domain consensus (0.127). However, the t-values for the 
gammas indicate that awareness significantly contributes to 
the variation of perceived interdependence and perceived 
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Table 4.9. The maximum likelihood of effects of endogenous 
variables on endogenous variables (beta) for 
Model 1 
Domain 
Consensus Interdependence Competition Contact 
Contact 127* .631** .490** -
Cooperation -.013 .721** .481* .193 
Conflict 135 -.051 1.396** .008 
*Signifleant: fc-value = 2.0 to 3.0. 
**Significant: t-value > 3.0. 
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Table 4.10. Direct, indirect, and total effects of 
independent on dependent variables 
Effect 
Dependent Independent Total Direct Indirect 
Variables Variables 
Domain Consensus Local Dependency .132 .132 -
Goal Similarity .052 .052 -
Awareness .127 .127 — 
Interdependence Local Dependency .149 .149 -
Goal Similarity .243 .243 -
Awareness .181 . 181 — 
Competition Local Dependency .029 .029 — 
Goal Similarity .714 .714 -
Awareness .133 .133 — 
Contact Local Dependency .091 — .091 
Goal Similarity .496 - .496 
Awareness .163 - .163 
Interdependence . 631 .631 -
Domain Consensus -. 127 -. 127 -
Competition .490 .490 — 
Coope ration Local Dependency . 137 — .137 
Goal Similarity .235 -.379 .614 
Awareness .224 - .224 
Interdependence . 843 .721 ,122 
Domain Consensus -. 038 -.013 -.025 
Competition . 576 .481 .095 
Contact .193 . 193 — 
Conflict Local Dependency .016 — .016 
Goal Similarity .208 -.773 .981 
Awareness . 161 - .161 
Interdependence —. 046 -.051 .005 
Domain Consensus -. 136 -.135 -.001 
Competition 1.400 1.396 .004 
Contact . 008 .008 — 
competition, but not domain consensus. Thus, based on the 
criteria set out above, only hypotheses 10 and 11 are 
confirmed by the data. 
The hypothesized relationship between perceived 
interdependence, domain consensus and contact is supported by 
the data. The relationships conform to the predicted 
direction in that perceived interdependence is positively 
correlated with contact while domain consensus is negatively 
correlated with contact. The positive sign of the path 
coefficient for competition and contact indicates that the 
predicted negative relationship between the two variables is 
not supported (see Table 4.9). 
Interestingly enough, all three variables make a 
significant and direct contribution to the explanation of 
interorganizational contact. The magnitude of the 
relationships between perceived interdependence, perceived 
competition and interorganization contact is quite large and 
significant in both cases (.631 for perceived interdependence 
and .490 for perceived competition). 
In addition to the direct effects that these three 
variables have on contact, the variation in 
interorganizational contact can also be explained by examining 
the indirect effects which the exogenous variables, goal 
similarity, local dependency, and awareness, have on contact 
through their relationship with perceived interdependence. 
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domain consensus, and perceived competition. These indirect 
effects are summarized in Table 4.10. 
In considering the relationships between perceived 
interdependence, domain consensus, and perceived competition 
with the two major dependent variables, cooperation and 
conflict, only one of the hypothesized relationships, that 
between perceived interdependence and cooperation, is 
confirmed. Perceived interdependence bears a positive and 
significant relation to cooperation (beta = .721). The 
hypothesized direction of the relationship between 
interdependence and conflict is upheld (-.051) but does not 
reach the desired level of statistical significance (Table 
4.9) . 
The hypothesized relationships between domain consensus 
and cooperation and conflict finds little support in the data. 
First, domain consensus does not make a significant contribu­
tion to the explanation of the variation in cooperation 
(-0.013). In fact, the direction of the relationship is 
opposite to that which was hypothesized. Secondly, although 
the hypothesized direction of the relationship between domain 
consensus and conflict is confirmed (beta = -0.135), the 
relationship does not reach the desired level of statistical 
significance (Table 4.10). 
As indicated in Table 4.9 the hypothesized relationships 
of perceived competition with cooperation and conflict are not 
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fully supported by the data. Perceived competition is 
significantly related in a positive direction to both 
cooperation (0.481) and conflict (1.396), but has a much 
larger direct effect on conflict. Thus, the hypothesized 
negative relationship between perceived competition and 
cooperation is disconfirmed. On the other hand, the 
hypothesis indicating a positive relationship between 
perceived competition and conflict is confirmed. In other 
words, perceived competition appears to contribute to the 
explanation of both cooperation and conflict in 
interorganizational relations. But since the magnitude of the 
relationship between perceived competition and conflict is 
much larger than that of its relationship with cooperation, 
perceived competition can be considered as a better predictor 
of conflict than of cooperation. 
As proposed by Blau (1977), interorganizational contact 
can lead to both cooperation and conflict. The direction of 
both hypotheses which predict a positive relationship between 
interorganizational contact and cooperation and conflict are 
confirmed. As indicated in Table 4.9, the path coefficients 
for contact and cooperation (0.193) and contact and conflict 
(0.008) are both positive, but neither is significantly 
related. 
In addition to the direct effects of goal similarity, 
perceived interdependence, domain consensus, perceived 
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competition, and contact, the explanation of the variance in 
cooperation and conflict, the indirect effects of the three 
exogenous and the other three endogenous variables through 
their prior relationship must also be examined. Table 4.10 
indicates the magnitude of these indirect effects. For 
example, goal similarity has an indirect effect of 0.614 on 
cooperation and 0.981 on conflict through its relationship 
with perceived interdependence, domain consensus, perceived 
competition, and contact. 
The Evaluation of the Model for Group 1 
It is interesting to assess whether or not the proposed 
model of interorganizational cooperation and conflict among 
organizations at the provincial and local level fits the data. 
In other words, whether or not this model can be used to 
predict the interorganizational relations observed for this 
group of organizations. Joreskog and Sorbom (1983) suggest 
that there are several tools for assessing the fit of the 
model to the data. Chi-square (% )/ the goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI) and the root mean square residual (RMR) can all be used 
to evaluate the overall model. In addition, the goodness of 
fit of the model can be assessed by examining the parameter 
estimates, e.g., standard errors, squared multiple 
correlations, and coefficients of determination. 
Large chi-square values indicate a bad fit whereas small 
chi-square values correspond to good fit. The degree of 
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freedom serves as a baseline for judging whether the 
chi-square is large or small. GFI is a measure of the 
relative amount of variance and covariance jointly accounted 
for by the model (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1983; 141). RMR 
refers to a measure of the average of the residual variances 
and covariances. The values of GFI and RMR can range from 
zero to one. A large value of GFI or Adjusted Goodness-of-fit 
Index (AGFI) indicates that a large proportion of the variance 
and covariance is explained by the model. On the contrary, 
large RMR suggests a considerable error in the proposed model. 
Based on these criteria, the proposed model does not fit the 
data when the chi-square value is taken into consideration. 
The chi-square value is 239.73 which is considerably larger 
than the chi-square value used as the standard, with degrees 
of freedom of 47 and a level of significance (a) of .05 
(67.5048). Neither the GFI, AGFI, nor the RMR indicate a 
strong goodness of fit of the model to the data. The values 
of GFI (.793) and AGFI (.599) are quite low. However, the RMR 
value at .128 indicates that the model does not contain much 
error in the estimation of parameters. 
When other indicators of the model are taken into 
consideration, there is an improvement in the model's 
performance. For example, no negative values of squared 
multiple correlations, or coefficients of determination were 
encountered. In general, the standard errors for all the 
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parameters in the model are quite low. However, there are 
some exceptions where the standard errors are quite high. For 
example, the standard errors in estimating the effects of goal 
similarity on conflict (.305), competition on both cooperation 
and conflict (.213, .424 respectively) are generally high (see 
Table 4.12). Also, Table 4.13 indicates that some of the 
values of variances and covariances of variables in the model 
have negative signs. 
Wheaton et al. (1977) and Carmines and Mclver (1981) 
propose a modified chi-square value, symbolically defined as 
2 
as a measure to assess the goodness of fit for the model. 
While Wheaten et al. suggest that a good fit of the model is 
indicated by a modified chi-square value not exceeding 5, 
Carmines and Mclvo suggest a modified chi-square value in the 
range of two to three as an indicator of good fit. 
= 239.73 
df 47 
= 5.1 > 5.0 
When the formula is applied to the present model,- the modified 
chi-square is only slightly larger than 5.0, the critical 
value for judging a good fit of the mode. 
In summary, several indicators indicate that this model 
does not fit the data. However, other indicators of goodness 
of fit are more positive, but they are not the major measures 
used to evaluate the model in the present study. 
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Table 4.11. Measures of the goodness of fit of the model to 
the data for Group 1 
Chi-square 239.73 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) .793 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) .599 
Root Mean Square Residual .128 
Total Coefficient of Determinant for 
Structural Equations .862 
Squared Multiple Correlation; 
a. For Y-variables (The Measurement 
Model 
Y1 (DOMCON) 0.770 
Y2 (GOLAC) 0.748 
Y3 (CLIS) 1.000 
Y4 (COMPT) 0.702 
Y5 (COMPET) 0.395 
Y6 (CONTACT) 1.000 
Y7 (COOP) 1.000 
Y8 (CLCOOP) 0.121 
Y9 (CONFLI) 1.000 
YIO (CONFME) 0.252 
b. For Structural Equations'^ 
ETAl (Domain Consensus) .038 
ETA2 (Interdependence) .165 
ETA3 (Competition) .797 
ETA4 (Contact) .597 
ETA5 (Cooperation) .670 
ETA6 (Conflict) .378 
^The proportion of variance in the indicators that is 
explained by their relationships with the latent endogenous 
variables. 
^The proportion of variance in the latent endogenous 
variables that is explained by the variables to which they are 
related in the model. 
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Table 4.12. Standard errors in the estimation of parameters 
for Group 1 
ETAl ETA2 ETA3 ETA4 ETA5 ETA5 
Y-variables: 
Y1 0.000 — — — — — 
Y2 — 0.000 — — — — 
Y3 — 0.086 — — — — 
Y4 - 0.000 - - -
Y 5 — — 0.100 — — — 
Y 6 — — — 0.000 — — 
Y7 — — — — 0.084 — 
Y8 — — — — 0.000 — 
Y9 — — — — — 0.000 
YIO _____ 0.077 
Structural Equations: 
ETAl — — — — — — 
ETA2 ______
ETA3 — — — — — — 
ETA4 .062 .088 0.090 - - -
ETA5 .059 .112 0.213 0.099 -
ETA6 .083 .141 0.424 0.139 -
X-variables; 
X. (LOCDEP) .088 .077 0.059 0.000 0.157 0.305 
X, (GOLS) .089 .080 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
X^ (AWANESS) .089 .079 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.13. Variance and covariance of parameter estimates 
for Group 1 
ETAl ETA2 ETA3 ETA4 ETA5 ETA6 
ETA-ETA: 
ETAl 1.000 
ETA2 .062 .770 
ETA3 .074 .228 .702 
ETA4 
-.052 .589 .479 1.025 
ETA5 .029 .675 .315 .656 .988 
ETA6 -.092 .065 .394 .249 . 197 1.004 
Y-ETA: 
Y1 .062 1.000 .074 -.052 .029 -.092 
Y2 .770 . .062 .228 .589 .675 .065 
Y3 .759 .061 .225 .581 .665 .064 
Y4 .228 .074 .702 .479 .315 .394 
Y5 .171 .055 .527 .359 .236 .296 
Y6 .589 -.052 .479 1.025 .656 .249 
Y7 .235 .010 .110 .229 .344 .069 
Y8 .675 .029 .315 .656 .988 .197 
Y9 .065 -.092 .394 .249 .197 1.004 
YIO .033 —. 046 . 198 . 125 .099 . 504 
X-ETA: 
XI .132 . 147 .025 .088 . 135 .014 
X2 .073 .272 .736 . 523 .272 .235 
X3 . 135 .221 .252 .246 .263 .195 
XI X2 X3 
ETA-X; 
ETAl . 132 .073 .135 
ETA2 .147 .272 .221 
ETA3 .025 .736 .252 
ETA4 .088 .523 .246 
ETA5 . 135 .272 .263 
ETA6 .014 .235 .195 
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Interorganizational Relationships Among Agricultural 
Support Organizations at the Local Level (Group 2) 
Figure 4.2 presents the magnitude of the relationships 
among variables determining interorganizational cooperation 
and conflict at the local level. 
Goal similarity is positively correlated with perceived 
interdependence, domain consensus, and perceived competition 
(Table 4.14). Even though the hypothesized directions of the 
relationships are supported, only goal similarity makes a 
significant contribution to the variation in perceived 
competition. Therefore, only hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the 
data. In addition, goal similarity is shown to be negatively 
correlated to both cooperation and conflict. Thus, the 
predicted positive relationship between goal similarity and 
cooperation is not found supported whereas the proposed 
direction of the relationship with conflict is confirmed. 
However, neither of these relationships reaches the desired 
level of statistical significance. This is demonstrated by 
looking at the magnitude of the relationships between goal 
similarity and conflict and cooperation (-0.025, -0.121 
respectively). Goal similarity also has an indirect effect of 
.084 on cooperation and .285 on conflict (Table 4.15). 
Comparatively, the total impact on conflict (.261) is greater 
than on cooperation (-0.037). 
Local dependency appears to be a significant factor in 
this model. It contributes significantly to the variation of 
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Figure 4.2. LISREL estimates for the interorganizational cooperation 
and conflict among local organizations (Group 2) 
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Table 4.14. The Maximum Likelihood of effects of exogenous 
variables on endogenous variables (gamma) 
Local Dependency Goal Similarity Awareness 
Domain Consensus . 190** .044 -.038 
Interdependence .125** .007 .437** 
Competition .095** .504** .098** 
Cooperation - -.121 -
Conflict - -.025 -
**Significant; t-value > 3.0. 
Table 4.15. The maximum likelihood of effects and endogenous 
variables on endogenous variables (beta) 
Domain 
Consensus Interdependence Competition Contact 
Contact .071 .726** .554** 
Cooperation .038 .170** .187 -. 113 
Conflict .005 .099 .444** .050 
**Significant: t-value > 3.0. 
perceived interdependence, domain consensus, and perceived 
competition. As hypothesized, the relationships of local 
dependency and the three variables are supported. Compared 
with the other two variables, the magnitude of the 
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relationship between local dependency and perceived 
competition (.095) is the lowest. 
The proposed relationship of awareness (knowledge about 
other organization's services and staff members) with 
perceived interdependence, domain consensus, and perceived 
competition is only partially confirmed. Only the 
hypothesized relationship of awareness and perceived inter­
dependence and that of awareness and perceived competition 
(H9) is supported by the data (Table 4.13). As the figures in 
the table indicate, awareness significantly contributes to 
explained variance of both perceived interdependence and 
perceived competition. 
The relationship between awareness and domain consensus 
was opposite in direction to that which was hypothesized. The 
resulting gamma (-.038) forces us to reject the hypothesis as 
stated. While not statistically significant, the tendency was 
that the higher the awareness of the other organization's 
services and staff members, the less likely was the 
organization to develop domain consensus (Table 4.14). 
When considering the relationship between perceived 
interdependence, domain consensus, perceived competition and 
contact, it is found that all three variables are positively 
related to contact (Table 4.15). Perceived interdependence 
has the highest correlation with contact (.726) and domain 
consensus has the lowest (.071). The direction of the 
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relationships between perceived interdependence, domain 
consensus and contact are hypothesized, even though the 
magnitude of the relationship between domain consensus and 
contact is not significant. However, the hypothesized 
negative relationship between perceived competition and 
contact was not found to be supported. The rejection of the 
hypothesis means that organizations with high degrees of 
perceived competition do not necessarily engage in less 
contact with each other. Table 4.16 contains the results of 
the indirect effects of the three exogenous variables on the 
explained variance in contact. Goal similarity, local 
dependency and awareness have indirect effects of .343, .157, 
.369 respectively on contact. According to these figures, 
goal similarity and awareness seem to have stronger indirect 
effects on contact than local dependency (see Table 4.16). 
For this model, it seems that the variation of cooperation 
and conflict can be explained by a combination of different 
variables. First, perceived interdependence is significantly 
correlated with cooperation, but not with conflict. On the 
other hand, perceived competition significantly contributes to 
the explained variance in conflict, but not cooperation. 
Therefore, hypotheses 15 and 18 are confirmed. However, the 
lack of a statistically significant negative relationship 
between perceived independence and conflict and perceived 
competition and cooperation indicates a lack of support for 
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Table 4.16. The direct, indirect, and total effects of 
independent on dependent variables 
Effect 
Dependent Independent Total Direct Indirect 
Variables Variables 
Domain Consensus Local Dependency .190 .190 -
Goal Similarity .044 .044 -
Awareness -.038 -.038 — 
Interdependence Local Dependency .125 .125 — 
Goal Similarity .007 .007 -
Awareness .437 .437 — 
Competition Local Dependency .095 .095 — 
Goal Similarity .604 .604 -
Awareness .098 .098 — 
Contact Local Dependency .157 — .157 
Goal Similarity .343 - .343 
Awareness .369 - .369 
Interdependence .726 - .726 
Domain Consensus .071 - .071 
Competition .554 — .554 
Cooperation Local Dependency .153 — .153 
Goal Similarity -.037 -.121 .084 
Awareness .487 - .487 
Infcerdependency 1.083 . 170 .918 
Domain Consensus .030 .038 -.008 
Competition .125 .187 — .062 
Contact -. 113 — -. 113 
Conflict Local Dependency .063 — .063 
Goal Similarity .261 -.025 .286 
Awareness .105 - .105 
Interdependence .135 .099 .036 
Domain Consensus .009 .005 .004 
Competition .472 .444 .028 
Contact .050 • — .050 
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hypothesis 16 and hypothesis 19. Perceived interdependence 
can lead to conflict, and at the same time, perceived 
competition can bring about cooperation between organizations. 
In examining the directions of the relationships between 
cooperation, conflict and contact, Blau's thesis did not 
receive support from the findings. Contact is positively 
correlated with conflict, but negatively correlated with 
cooperation (Table 4.15). Therefore, in terms of direction, 
the proposed positive relationship between contact and 
conflict is confirmed whereas the proposed positive 
relationship with cooperation is not supported. However, in 
terms of statistical significance, contact does not contribute 
to the explained variance of either cooperation or conflict. 
Contrary to Blau's argument, this model finds that 
organizations which are in frequent contact are less likely to 
cooperate and more likely to initiate conflict. 
Once again, we can contribute to the explanation of the 
variation in cooperation and conflict by examining the 
indirect effects caused by prior independent variables. Table 
4.16 presents the indirect effects of goal similarity, local 
dependency, awareness, perceived interdependence, domain 
consensus, and perceived competition on cooperation and 
conflict. Notice that perceived interdependence tends to have 
the largest indirect effect on cooperation (.918) whereas goal 
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similarity provides the strongest indirect effect on conflict 
(.286). 
The Evaluation of the Model for Group 2 
The same criteria used for evaluating the Model 1 are 
applied to the evaluation of this model. First of all, the 
chi-square value for this group indicates, again, a weak fit 
of the model to the data; (x2 = 277.05 > ~ 67.5048) (Table 
4.17). The chi-square value of the model is larger than the 
standard chi-square value at 46 degrees of freedom and for the 
critical value (a) of .05. However, the goodness of fit index 
GFI (.891), AGFI (.784), and the root mean square residual at 
.094 indicates that the amount of variance and covariance 
jointly accounted for by the model is quite high and that the 
average of the residual variances and covaciances is quite 
small. Generally, these measures indicate a better overall 
nit when compared to chat of the first model. 
2 When the total coefficient of determination (R - total) 
and squared multiple correlations are taken into 
consideration, they provide indications of a good fit; no 
negative values were found in the estimation of either 
2 parameter. Obviously, the total - R (.791) indicates that 
the variation of parameters estimated can be almost 80 percent 
explained by the model. Generally, the standard errors of all 
variables estimated are relatively small, except that for 
CONFLI (Y9) which has a standard error of .247. The variances 
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Table 4.17. The measures of the goodness of fit of one model 
to the data for Group 2 
Chi-square 277.05 
Goodness of Fit Index 0.891 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index .784 
Root Mean Square Residual 0.094 
Total Coefficient of Determinant for 
Structural Equations 0.791 
Squared Multiple Correlations; 
a. Y-variables (The Measurement 
Model) 
Y1 (DOMCON) 1.000 
Y2 (GOLAC) .585 
Y3 (CLIS) .493 
Y4 (COMPT) 0.607 
Y5 (COMPET) 0.817 
Y6 (CONTACT) 1.000 
Y7 (COOP) 1.000 
Y8 (CLCOOP) 0.131 
Y9 (CONFLI) 0.488 
YIO (CONFME) 0.181 
b. Structural Equations:^ 
ETAl (DOMAIN CONSENSUS) .038 
ETA2 (INTERDEPENDENCE) .345 
ETA3 (COMPETITION) 0.681 
ETA4 (CONTACT) 0.626 
ETA5 (COOPERATION) 0.708 
ETA6 (CONFLICT) 0.836 
The proportion of variance in the indicators that is 
explained by their relationships with the latent endogenous 
variables. 
^The proportion of variance in the endogenous variables 
that is explained by the variables to which they are related 
in the model. 
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and covariances of most parameters show positive values, which 
indicate a good fit of the model to the data (see Tables 4.18 
and 4.19). 
Using the measure proposed by Wheaton et al. (1977) and 
Carmines and Mclver (1981) calculates the modified chi-square 
2 
value (X ) 
df 
= 277.05 
df 46 
= 6.02 > 5.0 
We find that the model does not fit the data since the 
modified chi-square value is larger than 5.0. 
Hoelter (1983) developed a procedure called "critical-n" 
(CN) to assess the goodness of fit of LISREL models. He 
suggested that this measure can be used to evaluate models 
only when sample sizes are larger than 200. Therefore, this 
procedure could not be used to evaluate the first model which 
had only a sample size of 126. With 326 respondents in this 
sample, the procedure can be applied as an alternative 
assessment of the fit with data with the proposed model. The 
formulas, procedure and calculation can be shown as follows; 
CN = [Z(a)+ /(2df - 1)^ 
+ G 
2x /N - G 
where Z(a) is the critical Z value for the normal distribution 
at a given probability level. The degree of freedom is 
denoted by df, is the chi-square value for the model, and G 
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Table 4.18. Standard eccors in the estimation of parameters 
for Group 2 
ETAl ETA2 ETA3 ETA4 ETA5 ETA6 
Y-variables ; 
Y1 .000 
Y2 .000 
Y3 .075 
Y4 0.000 
Y5 0.069 
Y6 0.000 
Y7 0.000 
Y8 0.052 
Y9 0.247 
YIO 0.000 
Structural Equations; 
ETAl 
ETA2 
ETÀ3 
ETA4 .038 .073 0.062 
ETA5 .040 .127 0.115 0.089 
STA6 .025 .054 0.097 0.046 
X-variables; 
XI (LOCDEP) .055 .040 0.042 0.000 0.074 0.051 
X2 (GOLS) .058 .046 0.030 0.000 0.000 O.OOO 
X3 (AWANESS) .058 .047 0.032 0.000 0.000 O.OOO 
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Table 4.19. Variances and covariances of parameter estimates 
for Group 2 
ETAl ETA2 ETA3 ETA4 ETA5 ETA6 
ETA-ETA: 
ETAl 1.000 
ETA 2 .009 .585 
ETA3 .022 .153 .607 
ETA4 .090 .504 .441 .986 
ETA5 .041 .636 .155 .509 .992 
ETA6 .020 .143 .290 .284 .155 
Y-ETA: 
Y1 1.000 .009 .022 .090 .041 .020 
Y2 .009 .585 .143 .504 .636 .143 
Y3 .008 .537 .131 .463 .584 .131 
Y4 .022 .143 .607 .441 .155 .290 
Y5 .026 .166 .704 .512 .180 .337 
Y6 .090 .504 .441 .986 .509 . 284 
Y7 .041 .636 .155 .509 .992 .155 
Y8 .015 .231 .056 .185 .360 .056 
Y9 .033 .235 .477 .467 .254 .295 
YIO .020 . 143 .290 .284 .155 .180 
X-ETA; 
XI .188 .097 .030 .101 .127 .031 
X2 .012 . 151 .629 .459 .122 .293 
X3 -.034 .432 .308 .482 .464 . 194 
•X: XI X2 X3 
ETAl .188 .012 -.034 
ETA2 - .097 . 151 .432 
ETA3 .030 .629 .308 
ETA4 .101 .459 .482 
ETA5 .127 .122 .464 
ETA6 .031 .293 .194 
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refers to the number of groups being analyzed. Finally, N 
stands for the sample size in the group. For this analysis, a 
Z-value of 1.96 at the critical value of .05 will be used. 
CN = [1.96 + 2C46) - 1]2 + 1 
2 (277.05) 
(326 - 1) 
= [1.96 + /91]2 + 1 
554.10 
325 
= [1.96 + 9.54]- + 1 
1.705 
= 132.25 + 1 
1.705 
= 78.57 <.200 
A question might be raised as to why a group of 200 should 
be used as a critical number for evaluating the fit of the 
model to the data. Two main reasons are given to justify 
Hoelter's argument. First, with the sample size of 200 (G) or 
more, the average standardized residuals will be less than 1 
percent. Secondly, maximum likelihood estimation is not 
significantly affected by departure from normality when N is 
greater than 200. Based on this reasoning, Hoelter's CN 
procedure cannot be applied for the evaluation of Model 1 
because it has a sample size of less than 200. 
It appears that the CN-value for this group is less than 
200, which indicates a poor fit of the model to the data 
according to Hoelter's criteria. 
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The several measures used tend to indicate contradictory 
conclusions. While the model provides a weak fit based on 
certain procedures.- other measures indicate a stronger fit of 
the model to the data. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
The interorganizational relationship among organizations 
which hold vertical relationship and those which have 
horizontal relationships (within the district level) are 
somewhat different. It appears that interorganizational 
conflict and cooperation between the provincial agricultural 
support organizations and those at the local level, and among 
the local organizations themselves is determined by slightly 
different factors. For a complete list of hypotheses and 
results, see Table 5.19. 
Blau's thesis, that contact can lead to both cooperation 
and conflict, is not supported in either group. In Group 1, 
where organizational relationships span the provincial and 
local level, contact is positively, but not significantly 
related to cooperation and is not relate to conflict. In 
Group 2, contact is not significantly related to either 
cooperation or conflict, and in fact, bears a negative, 
nonsignificant relationship to cooperation. 
In Group 1, there is a tendency, however slight, for 
increased contact to be associated with increased cooperation. 
In Group 2, this same relationship is actually negative. This 
difference might be attributable to the more sporadic and 
utilitarian nature of contact in the vertical relationships 
emphasized in model 1. In other words, organizations in this 
kind of relationship display more of a tendency to approach 
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Table 5.1. A summary of hypothesis testing results 
HI: Organizations having a high degree of local 
dependency are more likely to develop a domain 
consensus. 
H2; Organizations having a high degree of local 
dependency are more likely to perceive 
interdependence with other organizations. 
H3; Organizations having a high degree of local 
dependency are more likely to compete with each 
other. 
Result: H1-H3 are not supported for Group 1, but are all 
supported for Group 2. 
H4: Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
cooperate with each other. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H5: Organizations with similar goals are less likely to 
initiate conflict with each other. 
Result: Supported for Group 1/ but not for Group 2. 
H6; Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
form domain consensus with one another. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H7: Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
perceive interdependence. 
Result; Supported for Group 1, but not for Group 2. 
H8: Organizations with similar goals are more likely to 
compete with each other. 
Result: Supported for both groups. 
H9: The more the organizations are aware of one another, 
the more likely they will develop a domain consensus. 
Result; Not supported for either group. 
HlO: The more the organizations are aware of one another, 
the more likely they perceive interdependence. 
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Table 5.1. Continued 
Hll: The more the organizations are aware of one another, 
the more likely they will compete with each other. 
Result: HlO-Hll are found significantly supported for both 
groups. 
H12: Organizations with high domain consensus are more 
likely to cooperate with each other than those with 
low domain consensus. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H13; Organizations with low domain consensus are more 
likely to engage in conflict. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H14: Organizations with high domain consensus are more 
likely to engage in frequent contact. 
Result; Not supported for either group. 
HIS: Organizations that possess a high degree of perceived 
interdependence are more likely to cooperate with 
other organizations. 
Result: Supported for both groups. 
H16: Organizations that possess a high degree of perceived 
interdependence are less likely to engage in 
conflict. 
Result; Not supported for either gropu. 
H17: Organizations which possess a high degree of 
perceived interdependence are more likely to engage 
in frequent contact. 
Result: Supported for both groups. 
HIS; Organizations that perceive a high degree of 
competition are more likely to have conflict with 
each other. , 
Result; Supported for both groups. 
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Table 5.1. Continued 
H19: Organizations with high perceived competition are 
less likely to cooperate with each other. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H20: Organizations with high degree of perceived 
competition are less likely to engage in frequent 
contact. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H21: The more frequently the organizations contact one 
another, the more likely that they will cooperate 
with each other. 
Result: Not supported for either group. 
H22: The more frequently the organizations contact one 
another, the more likely they will initiate conflict. 
Result; Not supported for either group. 
one another only when the need arises for assistance or 
cooperation. Therefore, interorganizational conflict is 
likely to be maintained at a relatively low level. 
This finding is inconsistent with previous studies (Reid, 
1969; Boje and Whetten, 1981) which have suggested that the 
physical proximity of the involved organizations will 
facilitate interorganizational cooperation. 
Knowledge and technical expertise can be considered as a 
source of power (Hall, 1982; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980) which 
will keep organizations at both the provincial and local 
levels cooperating with one another. While local 
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organizations might seek advice or assistance from provincial 
organizations, provincial organizations need the cooperation 
of local organizations in terms of program implementation and 
feedbackr information about farmers for formulating 
development plans. In other words, they must be 
interdependent in order to accomplish their own organizational 
goals. 
It is important to note that perceived interdependence in 
both groups is significantly correlated with cooperation, but 
negatively or nonsignificantly correlated with conflict in 
Group 1 and Group 2 respectively. Organizations who perceive 
high interdependence contact each other for the purpose of 
facilitating their relative work flows. Thus, conflict among 
these organizations is maintained at minimum level. The 
qualitative data collected from the interviews with the 
respondents indicates that when conflict does occur, it tends 
to center on disputes over means used by the provincial 
organizations to carry out their agricultural development 
projects. It frequently happens that the provincial 
organizations conduct their demonstration or experimental 
plots in local areas without notifying the local extension 
offices in advance. As an agency which is responsible for the 
extension services in the area, the local extension office 
should be informed in advance so that an effort can be made to 
notify the farmers about those activities taking place in the 
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given areas. This is important because some projects of 
provincial organizations directly involve the farmers who are 
sometimes confused by the inconsistent information provided by 
different agencies. 
It may be that local organizations find it rewarding to 
maintain relationships with provincial organizations. Their 
organization's reputation might be enhanced in the public eye. 
In addition, association with larger organizations can be a 
source of bargaining power at the local level. According to 
dependency theory, organizations try to liberate themselves 
from a dependent positions. One technique which can be used 
to diminish the dependent position is to ally themselves to a 
larger organization and in the process gain more bargaining 
power (Mulford, 1984). 
Unlike the case for the vertical relationships, increased 
contact at the horizontal level does not result in increased 
cooperation. The proximity of the organizations tends to 
facilitate competitive interactions, which are found to be 
related to an increased occurrence of interorganizational 
conflict. In addition, the majority of local organizations 
are private organizations with relatively equal status, 
working for maximum economic benefits, the probability of 
conflict initiation is relatively high. 
Domain consensus among local organizations is not 
significantly related to either cooperation or conflict. 
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However, at the vertical level, even though not significant in 
all cases, there is a tendency toward negative relationships 
between domain consensus and conflict, as predicted, as well 
as with contact and cooperation, both of which are contrary to 
the hypothesized relationship. Thus, a feeling of high domain 
consensus will not automatically lead to increased contact, 
probably because of the distances involved in vertical 
relationships. But the contact that does occur seems to be 
related to enhanced cooperation, a finding which is not 
repeated at the local level. 
In both groups, goal similarity is negatively correlated 
with cooperation and conflict but the relationships are 
significant only at the vertical level (Group 1). Certainly, 
organizations that have goals similar to one another are less 
likely to engage in a conflict relationship. However, it does 
not assure that they will work cooperatively either. Having 
similar goals does not appear to be a sufficient condition to 
motivate organizations to engage in either cooperation or 
conflict. Since goal similarity shows positive indirect 
effects on both cooperation and conflict, however, the 
relationship of these three variables appears to be 
conditioned by other variables. For Group 1 (vertical level) 
organizations having similar goals and high perceived inter­
dependence are more likely to cooperate than engage in 
conflict with one another. However, viewing contact as an 
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intervening between interdependence and cooperation, appears 
to lessen the overall relationship with cooperation. It is 
common that organizations with similar goals cannot avoid 
competition in securing needed resources and in providing 
services to clients. In order to survive, they might have to 
initiate certain cooperative actions even though they are 
involved in conflict in other ways. The magnitude of the 
relationship between perceived competition and conflict is 
much higher than that observed between perceived competition 
and cooperation, although both are significant and in a 
positive direction. 
The horizontal relationship of local organizations (Group 
2) is similar to the vertical one. While perceived 
interdependence, as an intervening variable, has a stronger 
effect on cooperation than on conflict, perceived competition 
is more strongly related to conflict than to cooperation. 
This phenomenon is true for both groups. Domain consensus 
tends to have little value as a significant intervening 
variable. Even though organizations, according to Group 1, 
demonstrate high consensus, they do not necessarily develop 
interorganizational cooperation or conflict. This same 
pattern can be observed in Group 2. 
In analyzing the interorganizational relationships of 
groups at both the vertical and horizontal levels, it seems 
apparent that competition is related to interorganizational 
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cooperation and conflict. To accomplish their respective 
goals, organizations often became interdependent in terms of 
resources and information exchange. In reality, organizations 
are operating in an uncertain environment. The survival of an 
organization depends largely on its ability to anticipate and 
counteract the behavior of organizations with which it 
interacts (Bedeian, 1984). Its interactions do not usually 
occur with a single organization, but rather with an 
organization set. An organization set consists of all the 
organizations with which a focal organization deals in 
pursuing its goals (Blau and Scott, 1962; Evan, 1966). An 
organization may play different roles in dealing with most 
contingent organizations. This idea is derived from Merton's 
concept of role set — the total set of role relationships in 
which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular 
social status such as physician, spouse, parent (Merton, 1957; 
105-120). Therefore, in dealing with a certain organization, 
a set of expectations may lead a focal organization to engage 
in cooperative relationships whereas in other situations with 
other organizations conflict might result. For example, while 
borrowing gooas and referring clients are common practices 
among independent retail businesses, they remain in a 
competitive position. On the other hand, some retail 
businesses may compete by reducing prices to attract more 
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customers, which can lead to heightened interorganizational 
conflict. 
Local dependency and awareness have indirect effect on 
cooperation and conflict through their relationships with 
perceived interdependence, domain consensus, and perceived 
competition. In both models, it appears that the two 
variables have a greater indirect effect on cooperation than 
conflict. The same pattern of relationships among local 
dependency, perceived interdependence, domain consensus, and 
perceived competition can be found in both models. Local 
dependency is positively, but not significantly correlated 
with the three variables in Group 1, whereas in Group 2 all 
three relationships are significant. Slight differences are 
observed in both groups when awareness is taken into 
consideration. While in Group 1, awareness is positively 
related to all three variables, it is positively correlated 
only with perceived interdependence and perceived competition 
in Group 2. The negative relationship observed between 
awareness and domain consensus in Group 2 is weak and not 
significant. The relationships between awareness and 
perceived interdependence and competition are positive and 
significant in both models. Notice once again that the 
relationship between awareness and domain consensus is the 
weakest, when compared with the other two variables. In both 
groups, the relationship fails to reach the desired level of 
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significance, even though it is stronger and in the predicted 
direction for Group 1.. This means that although local organi­
zations are knowledgeable about each others services and staff 
members, they do not necessarily share a domain consensus. 
But at the local level, proximity provides an opportunity for 
local organizations to acquire more information about one 
another because they are interdependent and compete with one 
another. However, additional knowledge about behaviors of 
other organizations may include negative aspects which are 
unacceptable to a focal organization. Therefore, domain 
dissension can be a result. Unlike the horizontal 
relationship of local organizations, the vertical relationship 
of provincial and local organizations tend to be more strongly 
related to domain consensus. Difference in the level of 
administration and greater physical distances between 
organizations tend to prevent them from knowing each other in 
great detail. From their more limited information, they might 
recognize one another as an agency which can provide certain 
resources and information when needed. Thus, they tend to 
accept their respective roles in agricultural development 
efforts. For example, the rice-mill owners might agree that a 
university and the research centers should get involved in 
agricultural development activities because of their areas of 
expertise. By the same token, respondents from the research 
centers and the university may respond similarly when asked 
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about the rice-mills because they play a significant role in 
the marketing structure. All of these are important 
components fo the agricultural development system. 
As far as the evaluation of the model is concerned, 
neither model provides a good fit with the data. However, 
there are some alternate measures which indicate am improved 
fit of the model to the data. Comparatively, the model 
provides a better fit for Group 2 than for Group 1 when taking 
the GFI, AGFI, and RMR into consideration. The GFI and AGFI 
for Group 2 are larger than those for Group 1. The RMR for 
Group 2 is much smaller that that of Group 1 (see Table 4.11 
and Table 4.17). The total coefficients of determinant for 
2 
structural equations (R - total) indicate that the proposed 
models explain almost 86 percent (Group 1) and 79 percent 
(Group 2) of the variation in the estimated parameters. 
Since this might be the first time that the models have 
been tested with samples outside the United States, retests of 
the model with different samples from different developing 
countries are necessary so that the model can be revised. 
Based upon this study, it appears that appropriate models for 
explaining interorganizational cooperation and conflict in 
developing countries can be established. 
Implications for Further Research 
1) Several variables which act as larger contextual variables 
for interorganizational cooperation and conflict need 
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further investigation. For example, the geographical 
proximity of organizations seems to be an important 
intervening variable. An interesting question concerns 
the nature of cooperative or conflicting relationships 
when geographical proximity is controlled, a phenomenon 
which could only be analyzed indirectly in this study. 
The types of organization, public or private, seems to be 
another important factor determining the state of 
interorganizational cooperation and conflict. A study of 
interorganizational cooperation and conflict could be 
designed which compares the nature of interorganizational 
relations of private and public organizations so that 
researchers could observe the predominant variables 
operating within and between the two types of groups. 
Also, based on the results of this study, the prevailing 
explanation concerning the effect of geographical 
proximity needs additional study. From our results, it 
seems more likely that organizations that are close to one 
another and are in frequent contact are less likely to 
establish interorganizational cooperation. On the 
contrary, there is a slight, but noticeable tendency for 
frequent contact to be associated with heightened 
interorganizational conflict at the local level. Thus, 
the geographical thesis is not supported by this study. 
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3) The notion of organization set and role set should be 
incorporated into the study of interorganizational 
cooperation and conflict. It seems promising to 
investigate cooperation and conflict from different 
dimensions of interorganizational relations. For example, 
it is possible that a focal organization cooperates with 
its counterpart in a certain type of interorganizational 
relationship but experiences conflict in the others. In 
other words, the nature of a dyadic relationship can be 
characterized as cooperative and conflicting at the same 
time. 
4) This study treats cooperation and conflict as discrete 
variables; they are not placed on a continuum. It might 
be intellectually stimulating to launch a comparative 
investigation of interorganizational cooperation and 
conflict by treating these two variables as discrete 
versus continuous, so that researchers can observe whether 
or not the same pattern of relationships is generated 
under the different set of assumptions. 
5) Efforts have been made in this study to collect data from 
different levels of organizational administration. It is 
believed that the responses received are more representa­
tive of the organization than those collected only from 
a single respondent, usually the organization's manager. 
Since the respondents represented various types of 
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organizations with different sizes, collecting data from 
different levels of organizations was sometimes 
impossible. In some cases, it was very difficult to get 
access to a full range of respondents, whereas, in others, 
there was no formal organizational structure at all, with 
the organization run exclusively by the owner. However, 
it is very important to observe the dynamics of 
interorganizational cooperation and conflict as they exist 
within different levels of organizational administration. 
For example, interorganizational cooperation might be very 
strong at the top executive level, but absent at a lower 
level of administration. Thus, the consistency of 
interorganizational behavior at different levels of 
administration is worth further investigation. 
6) Several sociological theories were used in this study to 
provide a backdrop for understanding interorganizational 
relationships among agricultural support organizations. 
Hypotheses were formulated based upon the explanations and 
assumptions derived from several major sociological 
theories, e.g., functionalism, conflict theory, exchange 
theory, and symbolic interactionism. One problem with 
this eclectic approach is that it is more difficult to 
arrive at general conclusions indicating the degree to 
which the major assumptions of a single theoretical model 
have either been supported or contradicted. The 
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application of a single theoretical model might 
conceivably make the job of theoretical induction from the 
empirical findings more straight forward. However, 
viewing social phenomena from a singular theoretical 
perspective can involve costs. First, a single theory 
might structure observations so that only one part of a 
complex phenomenon is analyzed. Thus, certain aspects of 
the phenomenon in question might remain unexplained. 
Finally, it might mislead the investigator in terms of 
interpreting the observed social relationships because 
there is no sociological theory which accounts for all 
aspects of social behavior. 
The application of multiple theories can minimize 
these disadvantages. The synthesis of various theories 
may be another alternative for future research projects in 
this area. 
This study found evidence to support the resource 
dependence perspective which posits that social 
organizations are interdependent in terras of needed 
resources and services. The relationships among the 
involved organizations can be characterized as symbiotic 
or commensalistic. This means that while organizations 
exchange resources and services to each other, they also 
compete with one another for scarce resources. According 
to Aldrich (1979), the relationship between the 
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organization and its environment contains both symbiotic 
and commensalistic elements. 
Due to the interorganizational division of labor, a 
state of asymetrical dependence on others is avoided by 
most organizations. Rather, they try to create and 
maintain a state of mutual dependence which will increase 
the potential bargaining power of both parties involved by 
seeking monopoly control over important resources. In the 
process, some organizations which find themselves unable 
to compete, become dependent on other organizations. 
Resource and information exchange among organizations 
seems to be the focus of this perspective. There are 
several factors enhancing the organizations to enter into 
interorganizational exchanges. Levine and White (1961) 
proposed that local dependency, goal similarity, and 
domain consensus are all associated with interorganiza­
tional exchanges. The same set of relationships was 
evident in the present study; local dependency, goal 
similarity, and domain consensus were observed to be 
positively correlated with cooperation (see Table A4.1 and 
Table A4.2 in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5). 
Interorganizational relationships, however, may not 
always be cooperative. Conflict might emerge due to the 
competition for scarce resources, and because of attempts 
to make other organizations dependent. Thus, the state of 
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interdependence can lead the involved organizations to 
engage in conflict. In thier study, Molnar and Rogers 
(1979) found that interdependence was positively 
correlated with conflict. Once again, the present study 
supports this relationship in that perceived 
interdependence and competition are both positively 
correlated with conflict (see Table A4.1 and Table A4.2 in 
Appendix 4 and Appendix 5). 
Thus, it is possible to break the larger, more 
complex model down by looking at specific relationships 
and examining how these findings relate to the accumulated 
literature in this field. A needed direction of future 
research is to arrive at the most internally consistent 
and parsimonius models in dealing with the complex 
phenomenon of interorganizational relationships. 
Implications for Policy Formulation 
1) The joint efforts of public and private organizations have 
been emphasized as important in accomplishing agricultural 
development goals. It seems that full awareness and 
knowledge of one another is an important factor in 
determining domain consensus, the recognition of 
interdependence, and competition, all of which affect 
interorganizational cooperation and conflict. Efforts 
should be made to increase information flow between the 
two types of organizations so that they can adjust and 
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explore the possible alternatives of working together in 
agricultural development projects. 
2) It is generally recognized that the objectives of public 
and private organizations are different. The variables 
included in this study may not be sufficient to fully 
understand the motivation for interorganizational 
cooperation. Psychological and socioeconomic incentives 
should also be explored as additional motivating factors 
for participation in joint activities. 
3) It appears that both cooperation and conflict are 
inevitable outcomes of interorganizational relationships. 
Given this recognition, it seems advisable for public and 
private organizations to be aware of this and to discover 
ways to channel both cooperation and conflict into 
strategies to achieve agricultural development objectives. 
4) The organizational structure of public and private 
organizations is generally different. At the very least, 
a revision of organizational structure of both types is 
necessary so that they can work together in competitive 
situations. Public and private organizations can no 
longer expect to automatically conform to the 
administrative rules and regulations of each other. It 
seems that new rules and regulations which are acceptable 
to both types of organization are sorely needed. Public 
organizations, which usually rely on a bureaucratic type 
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of administration, might find it advantageous to make some 
adjustments in organizational structure so that they can 
deal with private organizations more effectively. 
5) It seems that the government has to reconsider the issue 
of delegation of authority. Decentralization is a 
necessary condition to facilitate the joint efforts of 
public and private organizations. Governmental organi­
zations at the provincial and district levels should be 
more flexible in making decisions with regard to their 
organizational activities including the decision to 
initiate and maintain interorganizational relations with 
their constituencies. Theoretically, decentralization is 
defined as the transfer of planning, decision-making, or 
administrative authority from the central government to 
its field organizations, local administrative units, local 
government, or nongovernmental organizations so as to 
carry out their tasks (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). As 
implied in the results of this study, the organizations 
engaging various forms of interorganizational relations 
depend largely on local services and cooperation. They 
also recognize the importance of actual or potential 
organizational interdependence in accomplishing 
organizational goals, and in providing services to 
clients. In addition, perceived competition seems to be a 
significant factor determining the nature of 
157 
interorganizational relations. Taking these conditions 
into consideration, the governmental organizations in the 
field should be given more flexibility in making decisions 
so as to develop the appropriate strategies to deal with 
their counterparts. Both Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) and 
Leonard and Marshall (1982) agree that decentralization 
should receive immediate attention from the governments of 
third world countries when dealing with development 
programs. 
158 
REFERENCES 
Abd-Ella, Mokhtar Mohamed 
1979 "A Study of Family Farm Effectiveness." Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State University. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation. 
Abd-Ella, Mokhtar M. and Eric O. Hoiberg 
1981 "Adoption Behavior in Family Farm System: An Iowa 
Study." Rural Sociology 46(1):42-61. 
Aiken, M. and J. Hage 
1968 "Organizational interdependence and interorganiza­
tional structure." American Sociological Review 
33:912-930. 
Aldrich, Howard 
1971 "Organizational boundaries and interorganizational 
conflict." Human Relations 24(4):279-93. 
Aldrich, Howard E. 
1972 "An organization-environment perspective on 
cooperation and conflict between organizations in 
the Manpower Training System." Pp. 49-70 in Anant 
R. Negandhi (ed . ), Interorganizational Theory. 
Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 
Aldrich, Howard E. 
1975 Organization Sets, Action Sets, and Networks: 
Making the Most of Simplicity. Ithaca, New York; 
School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Cornell 
University. 
Aldrich, Howard E. 
1976 "Resource dependence and interorganizational 
relations." Administration and Society 7:419-454. 
Aldrich, Howard E. 
1979 Organizations and Environment. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Apapirom, Anat 
1984 "Agriculture in Thailand: Its Importance and 
Policy." Pp. 21-31 in The Office of National 
Committee on Economic and Social Development, Rural 
Thailand 1984 (original in Thai). Bangkok, 
Thailand; The United Production Press. 
159 
Ashby, Jacqueline and E. Walter Coward, Jr. 
1980 "Putting Agriculture Back into the Study of Farm 
Practice Innovation: Comment on status, knowledge 
and innovation." Rural Sociology 45(3):520-523. 
Assael, Henry 
1969 "Constructive role of interorganizational conflict." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 14:573-582. 
Bacharach, Samuel B. and Edward J. Lawler 
1980 Power and Politics in Organizations. San Francisco, 
California: Jossey-Bass. 
Barth, Ernest A. 
1963 "The causes and consequences of interagency 
conflict." Sociological Inquiry 33:51-57. 
Bates, Frederick L. and Lloyd Bacon 
1972 "The community as a social system." Social Forces 
50:371-379. 
Bedeian, Arthur G. 
1984 Organizations: theory and analysis. New York, New 
York: The Dryden Press. 
Benson, J. Kenneth, Joseph T. Kunce, Charles A. Tompson and 
David L. Allen 
1973 Coordinating Human Services. Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri, Regional Rehabilitation 
Research Institute. 
Benson, J. Kenneth 
1975 "The interorganizational network as a political 
economy." Administrative Science Quarterly 
20:229-249. 
Bernard, Jessie 
1949 American Community Behavior. New York, New York; 
The Dryden Press. 
Blau, Peter M. 
1977 Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of 
Social Structure. New York, New York: The Free 
Press. 
Blau, Peter M. and W. Richard Scott 
1962 Formal Organizations. San Francisco, California: 
Chandler Press. 
160 
Boje, David M. and David A. Whetten 
1981 "Effects of Organizational Strategies and 
Constraints on Centrality and Attributions of 
Influence in Interorganizational Networks." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 
26(September): 378-395. 
Brown, Lawrence A. 
1981 Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective. New York, 
New York: Methuen. 
Brown, Lawrence A., Malecki, E. J., and A. N. Spector 
1976 "Adopter categories in a spatial context; 
alternative explanations for an empirical 
regularity." Rural Sociology 41(1);99-118. 
Bryant, Coralie and Louise G. White 
1982 Managing Development in the Third World. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
Cancian, Frank 
1967 "Stratification and risk-taking: a theory tested on 
agricultural innovation." American Sociological 
Review 32:912-927. 
Cancian, Frank 
1976 "Reply to Morrison, Kumar, Rogers and Fliegel." 
American Sociological Review 41:1089-1093. 
Caplan, Nathan and Stephen D. Nelson 
1973 "On being useful: the nature and consequences of 
psychological research on social problems." 
American Psychologist 28:199-211. 
Carmines, Edward G. and John P. Mclver 
1981 "Analyzing models with unobserved variables: 
Analysis of covariance structures." Pp. 65-115 in 
George W. Bohrnstedt and Edgar F. Borgatta (eds.). 
Social Measurement: Current Issues. Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publications. 
Cheema, G. Shabbir and Dennis A. Rondinelli 
1983 Decentralization and Development: policy 
implementation in developing countries. Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications. 
Cook, Karen S. 
1977 "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganiza­
tional Relations." Sociological Quarterly 
18{Winter):62-82. 
161 
Coser, Lewis A. 
1956 The Functions of Social Conflict. London; Free 
Press of Glencoe. 
Dahrendorf, Ralf 
1959 Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. 
Stanford, California; Stanford University Press. 
Department of Agricultural Extension, The 
1983 "Introducing the Department of Agricultural 
Extension." Bangkok, Thailand (Original in Thai). 
Department of Economic Commerce, The 
1984 The Report of Study for Improving the Marketing 
System of Agricultural Products in the Northeast 
Region. Bangkok, Thailand: The Department of 
Economic Commerce, Ministry of Commerce (original in 
Thai). 
Durkheim, Emile 
(1893) 
1949 The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by 
George Simpson- Glencoe; Free Press. 
Evan, William M. 
1966 "The organizational-set; toward a theory of 
interorganizational relations." Pp. 173-191 in 
James D. Thompson (ed.). Approach to Organizational 
Design. Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
Frawley, James Peter 
1973 "Some Social, Social-psychological and Personal 
Factors Related to Farm Management Performance." 
Ames, Iowa; Iowa State University. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph and Deborah Shatin 
1981 "Leadership and networking among neighborhood human 
service organizations." Administrative science 
Quarterly 26;434-448. 
Gartrell, John W., E. Ashilkening and H. A. Presser 
1973 "Curvilinear and linear models relating status and 
innovative behavior: A measurement." Rural 
Sociology 38(4);391-411. 
162 
Geertsen, Reed and Gary Madsen 
1986 "Vertical community ties and interorganizational 
conflict." Paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the Rural Sociological Society, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Glass, James J. 
1976 "Conflict or cooperation: Substate districts and 
comprehensive health planning agencies." Growth and 
Change: A Journal of Regional Development 7:18-24. 
Goldman, R. M. 
1966 "A theory of conflict processes and organizational 
offices." Journal of Conflict Resolution 
10:328-343. 
Grant, George F. 
1979 Development Administration: Concepts, goals, 
methods. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Hall, Richard H. 
1982 Organizations: Structure and Process (3rd ed.). 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall. 
Hall, Richard H., John P. Clark, Peggy Giordano, Paul Johnson 
and M. Rockel 
1977 "Patterns of interorganizational relationships." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 22:457-474. 
Hall, Richard H., John P. Clark and Peggy C. Giordano 
1978 The Extent and Correlates of Interorganizational 
Conflict. Albany, New York: Department of 
Sociology, State University of New York at Albany. 
Halpert, Burton P. 
1982 "Antecedents." Pp. 54-72 in David L. Rogers and 
David A. Whetten (eds.), Interorganizational 
Coordination: Theory, research, implementation. 
Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. 
Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman 
1977 "The population ecology of organizations." American 
Journal of Sociology 82(5):929-964. 
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel 
1984 Human Service Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
163 
Havens, A. Eugene and William Flinn 
1975 "Green Revolution Technology and Community 
Development: the limits of action programs." 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 23:469-481. 
Hawley, Amos H. 
1950 Human Ecology: A theory of community structure. 
New York, New York: Ronald. 
Hoelter, Jon W. 
1983 "The analysis of covariance structures: goodness-
of-fit indices." Sociological Methods and Research 
11:325-344. 
Horowitz, Irving Louis 
1963 "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation; A 
sociological inventory." Social Forces 41:177-188. 
Hunter, G. 
1974 Modernizing Peasant Societies: 
in Asia and Africa. New York : 
Press. 
A Comparative Study 
Oxford University 
Johnston, Bruce F. 
1966 "Agriculture and Economic Development: The 
Relevance of the Japanese Experience." Food 
Research Institute Studies 6(3):251-312. 
Johnston, Bruce F. and William C. Clark 
1982 Redesigning Rural Development: A Strategic 
Perspective. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Joreskog, Karl G. and Dag Sorbom 
1983 LISREL: Analysis of Linear Structural Relationships 
by the Method of Maximum Likelihood, User's Guide, 
Versions V and VI. 2nd ed. Uppsala, Sweden: 
Department of Statistics, University of Uppsala. 
Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn 
1978 The Social Psychology of Organizations. 
John Wiley and Sons. 
New York: 
Khon Kaen University 
1984 Annual Report 1983. Khon Kaen: 
University, Thailand. 
Khon Kaen 
164 
Klonglan, Gerald E., Richard D. Warren, Judy M. Winkelpleck 
and S. K. Paulson 
1976 "Interorganizational measurement in the social 
services sector: Differences by hierarchical 
level." Administrative Science Quarterly 
21:675-687. 
Laumann, Edward 0./ Joseph Galaskiewicz and Peter V. Marsden 
1978 "Community structure as interorganizational 
linkages." Annual Review of Sociology 4:455-484. 
Donald E. Albricht, Arlen G. Leholm and Leistritz, F. Larry, 
Steve H. Murdock 
1986 "Impact of Agricultural Development on Socioeconomic 
Change in Rural Areas." Pp. 109-137 in Peter F. 
Korsching and Judith Gildner (eds.), 
Interdependencies of Agriculture and Rural 
Communities in the Twenty-first Century: The North 
Central Region. Ames, Iowa: The North Central 
Regional Center for Rural Development, Iowa State 
University. 
Leonard, David K. and Dale Rogers Marshall 
1982 Institutions of Rural Development for the Poor: 
Decentralization and Organizational Linkages. 
Berkeley, California: University of California. 
Levine, Sol and Paul E. White 
1961 "Exchange as a conceptual framework for the study of 
interorganizational relations." Administrative 
Science Quarterly 5:583-801. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 
1980 Applied Regression; 
Hills, California: 
An Introduction. Beverly 
Sage Publications. 
Litwak, Eugene and Lydia F. Kylton 
1962 "Interorganizational analysis: A hypothesis on 
coordinating agencies." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 6:395-426. 
Litwak, Eugene and Jack Rothman 
1970 "Towards the theory and practice of coordination 
between formal organizations." Pp. 137-186 in 
William R. Rosengren and Mark Lefton (eds.). 
Organization and Clients: Essays in the sociology 
of service. Columbus, Ohio : Charles E.-Merrill 
Publishing Company. 
165 
Loomis f Charles P. 
1960 Social System; Essays on their persistence and 
changes. Princeton; D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 
LoomiSf Charles P. and J. Allen Beegle 
1975 A Strategy for Rural Change. New York : Schenkman 
Publishing Company. 
Mellor, John 
1976 The New Economics of Growth. Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press. 
Merton, Robert K. 
1957 "The role-set; problems in sociological theory." 
British Journal of Sociology 8:106-120. 
Ministry of Commerce, The 
1984 The Study of Marketing System for Agricultural 
Products in the Northeast Region, Thailand (original 
in Thai). Bangkok, Thailand; Funny Publishing. 
Mokhzani, B. Abdul Rahim (ed.) 
1981 Rural Development in Southeast Asia. New Delhi: 
vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd. 
Molnar, Joseph J. 
1978 "Comparative organizational properties and 
interorganizational interdependence." Sociology and 
Social Research 63(1):24-48. 
Molnar, Joseph J. and David L. Rogers 
1979 "A comparative model of interorganizational 
conflict." Administrative Science Quarterly 
24:405-425. 
Moris, Jon R. 
1981 Managing Induced Rural Development. Bloomington, 
Indiana: International Development Institute. 
Morrissey, Joseph P., Richard H. Hall and M. L. Lindsey 
1982 Interorganizational Relations: a sourcebook of 
measures for mental health programs. Rockville, 
Maryland; National Institute of Mental Health. 
Mulford, Charles L. 
1980 "Dyadic properties as correlates of exchanges and 
conflict between organizations." Ames, Iowa: 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Iowa State 
University. 
166 
Mulford/ Charles L. 
1984 Interorganizational Relations: Implications for 
community development. New York: Human Sciences 
Press, Inc. 
Mulford, Charles L. and Mary A. Mulford 
1977 "Community and interorganizational perspectives on 
cooperation and conflict." Rural Sociology 
42(4):569-590. 
Mulford, Charles L. and David L. Rogers 
1982 "Definitions and models." Pp. 9-32 in David L. 
Rogers and David A. Whetten (eds . ), 
Interorganizational Coordination; Theory, research, 
and implementation. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press. 
National Statistical Office, The 
1984 Statistical Yearbook, Thailand: 1981-1984. 
Bangkok, Thailand: The National Statistical Office, 
Office of the Prime Minister. 
Negandhi, Anant R. 
1975 "Interorganizational theory: A step beyond the 
present." Pp. 252-261 in Anant R. Negandhi (ed.), 
Interorganization Theory. Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
University Press. 
Office of Commerce, The 
1984 Marketing Information in Khon Kaen Province, 1984 
(original in Thai). Khon Kaen, Thailand: The 
Office of Commerce, Khon Kaen Province, Ministry of 
Commerce. 
Office of Committee for National Economic and Social 
Development, The 
1982 Economic and Social Journal (July-August):69 
(original in Thai). 
Office of Committee for National Economic and Social 
Development, The 
1984 Rural Thailand 1984 (original in Thai). Bangkok, 
Thailand; The United Production Press. 
Olson, Marvin E. 
1968 The Process of Social Organization. New York, New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
167 
Olsen, Marvin E. and Penelope Canan, Michael Hennessy 
1985 "A value-based community assessment process; 
Integrating quality of life and social impact 
studies." Sociological Methods and Research 
13(3):325-361. 
Osborn, Richard N. and James G. Hunt 
1974 "Environment and organizational effectiveness." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 19:231-246. 
Parsons, Talcott 
1951 The Social System. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press. 
Paulson, Steven K. 
1976 "A thoery and comparative analysis of 
interorganizational dyads." Rural Sociology 
41(Fall):311-329. 
Pedhazur, Elazar J. 
1982 Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research: 
Explanation and prediction. New York, New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald Salancik 
1978 The External Control of Organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York, New York: Harper 
and Row. 
Reid, William 
1964 "Interagency coordination in delinquency prevention 
and control." Social Science Review 38:418-428. 
Reid, William J. 
1969 "Interorganizational Coordination in Social Welfare: 
A Theoretical Approach to Analysis and 
Intervention." Pp. 188-200 in R. M. Kramer and H. 
Spect (eds.). Readings in Community Organization 
Practice. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Ritzer, George 
1983 Sociological Theory. New York, New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Rogers, David L. 
1974 "Sociometric analysis of interorganizational 
relations: Application of theory and measurement." 
Rural Sociology 39(Winter);487-503. 
168 
Rogers, David L. 
1984 "Antecedents of interorganizational coordination: 
local government participation in regional 
councils." Paper presented at the annual meetings 
of the Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
Rogers, David L. and David A. Whetten (eds.) 
1982 Interorganizational Coordination; Theory, research, 
and implementation. Ames, Iowa; Iowa State 
University Press. 
Rogers, Everett M. 
1983 Diffusion of Innovations. New York, New York: The 
Free Press. 
Sajjabanpot, Wanchai 
1985 "The use of combined communication channels to 
improve agricultural extension in Thailand." M.S. 
thesis, W. Robert and Ellen Serge Parks Library, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
Schermerhorn, John R., Jr. 
1975 "Determinants of interorganizational cooperation." 
Academy of Management Journal 18;846-56. 
Schmidt, Stuart M. and Thomas A. Kochan 
1977 "Interorganizational relationships: Patterns and 
motivations." Administrative Science Quarterly 
23:220-234. 
Scott, w. Richard 
1981 Organizations: Rational, natural, and open systems. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Simmel, George 
1955 Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. New 
York, New York; Free Press. 
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 
1959 "Bureaucratic and craft administration of 
production." Administrative Science Quarterly 
4;168-187. 
Strasser, Hermann and Susan C. Randall 
1981 An introduction to theories of social change. 
Boston, Massachusetts: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
169 
Thomas, Edwin J. 
1957 "Effects of facilitative role interdependence on 
group functioning." Human Relations 10:347-366. 
Thompson, J. D. 
1967 Organizations in action. New York; McGraw-Hill. 
Thorbecke, E. 
1979 "Agricultural Development." Pp. 132-205 in W. 
Galenson (ed.). Economic Growth and Structural 
Change in Taiwan: The Postwar Experience of the 
Republic of China. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Todaro, Michael P. 
1985 Economic Development in the Third World (2nd ed.). 
New York: Longman. 
Tropman, John E. 
1974 "Conceptual approaches in interorganizational 
analysis." Pp. 144-158 in Fred M. Cox et al. 
(eds.). Strategies of Community Organization. 
Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. 
Tropman, John E. and Milan J. Dluhy 
1976 "Some Problems in Federal-City Collaboration in the 
1950's and 1970's: An analysis." Journal of Social 
Welfare 3:47-58. 
Turner, Jonathan H. 
1978 The Structure of Sociological Theory. Homewood, 
Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 
Turner, Jonathon H. 
1986 The Structure of Sociological Theory (4th ed.). 
Chicago, Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 
Tweeten, Luther G. 
1979 Foundation of Farm Policy (2nd ed.). Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Van de Ven, Andrew H. and Diane L. Ferry 
1980 Measuring and Assessing Organizations. New York, 
New York: Wiley. 
Van de Ven, Andrew H. and Gordon Walker 
1984 "The dynamics of interorganizational coordination." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 29:598-621. 
170 
Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 
1963 "Dialectic and functionalism; Toward a theoretical 
synthesis." American Sociological Review 
28(5);695-705. 
Warren, Roland L. 
1967 "The interorganizational field as a focus for 
investigation." Administrative Science Quarterly 
12:396-419. 
Warren, Roland L. 
1978 The Community in America (3rd edition). Chicago, 
Illinois: Rand McNally College Publishing Company. 
Warren, Roland, Stephen Rose, and Ann Bergunder 
1974 The Structure of Urban Reform. Lexington, 
Massachusetts; D. C. Heath. 
Wells, Deborah L. and Charles L. Mulford 
1983 "Correlates of exchange in dyads of human service 
organizations." Ames, Iowa: Industrial Relations 
Associate, Iowa State University. 
Wheaton, Blari, Bengt Muthen, Duane F. Alwin and Gene W. 
Summers 
1977 "Assessing reliability and stability in panel 
models." Pp. 84-136 in David R. Keise (ed.). 
Sociological Methodology 1977. San Francisco, 
California: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Whetten, David A. and Eugene Szwajkowski 
1978 Relational Variables in Incerorganizational 
Research: Conceptual and Methodological Issues. 
Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois. 
Wilson, John 
So 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
1983 cial Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Zeitz, Gerald 
1980 "Interorganizational Dialectics." Administrative 
Science Quarterly 25:72-78, 
Zey-Ferrell, Mary 
1979 Dimensions of Organizations. Santa Monica, 
California; Goodyear Publishing Company. 
171 
Zober, Edith 
1979 "Exchange and power as frameworks for the study of 
cooperation and conflict in dyadic relations of 
organizations." Ph.D. dissertation, W. Robert and 
Ellen Sorge Parks Library, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa. 
172 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
First of all, I would like to thank the World Food 
Institute, Iowa State University, the Research and Development 
Institute, Khon Kaen University, Khon Kaen, Thailand, and the 
Fulbright Foundation for funding this study. The greatest 
debt is owed to my major professor. Dr. Eric 0. Hoiberg, who 
guided me through the theoretical framework, data analysis, 
and every other aspect of the research process. I have been 
impressed by his expertise and professionalism. His kindness 
and patience has made it easy to work with him. 
A special thanks to Dr. Charles L. Mulford, who introduced 
me to the study of interorganizational relationships, and who 
provided valuable guidance in problem conceptualization. The 
other members of my advisory committee. Dr. Gordon L. Bultena, 
Dr. Willis J. Goudy, and Dr. Eric A. Abbott also provided 
vital suggestions to the setting of my research. Thanks also 
to Dr. Gerald E. Klonglan, Chair, the Department of Sociology 
and Anthropology, who encouraged me to conduct this research 
project. 
I am indebted to Ajarn Sumaree Ratanapanya, my colleague 
at the Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities 
and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University, who helped me 
collect the data. Thanks to all respondents who voluntarily 
173 
participated in the interviews, and to other organizations in 
Khon Kaen province, which made the collection of data 
possible. 
174 
APPENDIX 1. LIST OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 
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Organizations at the Provincial Level 
1. Maung Rice Research Station 
2. Chumpae Rice Research Station 
3. Field-crop Research Center 
4. Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University 
5. The Office of Commerce, Khon Kaen Province 
Organizations at the District Level 
Ban-Pai district 
6. Ban-Pai Extension Office 
7. Ban-Pai Agricultural Cooperative 
8. Bangkok Bank, Ltd. 
9. Thai Farmer Bank 
10. Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
11. Raeng-Sin-Thai Rice-mill, Ltd. 
12. Kasetsin Rice-mill, Ltd. 
13. Tanyasiri Rice-mill, Ltd. 
14. Kao-na, Ltd. 
15. Pantawee, Ltd. 
16. Ban-Pai Chokdee, Ltd. 
Chumpae district 
17. Chumpae Extension Office 
18. Chumpae Agricultural Cooperative 
19. Bangkok Bank, Ltd. 
20. Thai Farmer Bank, Ltd. 
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21. Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
22. Meechai Rice-mill, Ltd. 
23. Thaisagnone Rice-mill, Ltd. 
24. Sahachai Chumpae Rice-mill, Ltd. 
2 5. Kon-Kaset Company 
26. Chumpae Pharmacy Company 
27. Rung-Pesuch Company 
Kranone district 
28. Kranone Extension Office 
29. Kranone Agricultural Cooperative 
30. Krung-Thai Bank, Ltd. 
31. The Union Bank of Bangkok, Ltd. 
32. Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
33. Kranone Rice-mill, Ltd. 
34. Teng-Tum Rice-mill, Ltd. 
3 5. Chareon-Panich Company 
36- Siam-Pan Company 
37. Thai-Chareon Company 
Maunq district 
38. Maung Extension Office 
39. Maung Agricultural Cooperative 
40. Bangkok Bank, Ltd. (Pracha-Samosone Rd.) 
41. Thai Farmer Bank (Pracha-Samosone Rd.) 
42. Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
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43. Tanyatip Rice-mill, Ltd. 
44. Kruntong Rice-mill, Ltd. 
45. Lamtong Rice-mill, Ltd. 
46. Chaimongkol Rice-mill, Ltd. 
47. Pairatpanich-Kankaset, Ltd. 
48. Sam-Leam Kankaset, Ltd. 
49. Sangtawee, Ltd. 
50. Teng-Ha, Ltd. 
Nam-Pong district 
51. Nam-Pong Extension Office 
52. Nam-Pong Agricultural Cooperative 
53. Krungsri Aydhaya Bank 
54. Bank of Asia 
55. Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
56. Nam-Pong Hai-Hing Peach-Pol Rice-mill, Ltd. 
57. Leng-Seng-Tai Rice-mill, Ltd. 
58. Kasemsuk Panich 
59. Ying-Yong Pharmacy 
60. S. Rung-Chareone 
61. Hong-Seng-Heng 
62. Sangtawee 
63. Katwatana 
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Pol district 
64. Pol Extension Office 
6 5. Pol Agricultural Cooperative 
66. Bangkok Bank, Ltd. 
67. Thai Farmer Bank 
68. Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
69. Sang-Tawan Rice-mill, Ltd. 
70. Tirawat Rice-mill, Ltd. 
71. Tanya-Chareone Rice-mill, Ltd. 
72. Amone-Kankaset, Ltd. 
73. Kimheng, Ltd. 
74. Chareone-Pol, Ltd. 
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Survey of Agricultural Support Organizations 
at Khon Kaen, Thailand 
In order to analyze the nature of interorganizational 
relationships among agricultural support organizations, we 
need to make a general observation regarding how your 
organization interacts with other organizations. 
1. How many full-time paid staff work in your 
organization? 
2. How many temporary paid staff work in your 
organization? 
3. How many departments/divisions are there in your 
organizat ion? 
4. Now, I would like to find out about the educational 
background of your staff. Out of the total number 
of employees that work here, how many hold the 
highest degree of: 
a) Elementary school 
b) High school 
c) College 
d) Bachelor's degree 
e) Master's degree 
f) Doctorate degree 
g) Other 
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During the past year, what was the average number 
of clients served directly by your organization 
per month? 
Which of the following functions does your Yes No 
organization perform? 
- Conducting research (agricultural, marketing, 
etc.) 12 
- Providing agricultural information 1 2 
- Providing agricultural marketing and price 
information 1 2 
- Selling input subsidies: 
• fertilizer 1 2 
• insecticide 1 2 
e herbicide 1 2 
• new varieties 1 2 
• other 1 2 
- Providing credits and loans 1 2 
- Buying agricultural products 1 2 
- Other 1 2 
Does your organization have written regulations 
to coordinate its activities? 1 2 
Who has the ultimate decision making authority in your 
organization? 
In providing services to your organization's clients, 
would you prefer to work: 
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- alone, with little or no inputs from other 
organizations? 
- cooperatively, with modest inputs from other 
organizations? 
- cooperatively, with a great deal of input from other 
organizations? 
10. What proportion of your organization funding or income 
comes from each of the following sources? 
- National % 
- Regional % 
- Provincial % 
11. What percentage of your staff is recruited from this 
province? % 
To no Some Great 
extent extent extent 
12. To what extent does your 
organization depend upon facilities 
and personnels from outside this 
province? 
13. To what extent do you think that 
the success of your organization 
depends on facilities and services 
received from other local 
organizations? 
14. To what extent do you think that 
the effective provision of 
services to your clients depends 
on the cooperation of other local 
organizations? 
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Section II. How well do you know other organizations? 
In this section, we would like to discover the extent to which 
you have knowledge of other organization's goals, the services 
they provide, and clients they serve. 
15. Are you familiar with each of the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Department of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
Yes No 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Not at Not very Somewhat Quite Very 
all well well wel well 
16. How well do you know 
about the services 
provided by each of 
the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
d 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
184 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
How well acquainted are 
you with the staff 
members of each of the 
following organizations? 
- Extension Office 1 
- Research Station 1 
- University 1 
- Cooperative 1 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 
- Retail Business 1 
- Bangkok Bank 1 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Completely Similar, but Completely 
Different not identical the same 
To what extent are 
your organization's 
goals similar to those 
of each of the 
following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
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- Cooperative 12 3 
- Dept. of Commerce 12 3 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 
- Thai Farmer Bank 12 3 
- BAAC 1 2 3 
- Companies 12 3 
Not Somewhat Very 
important important important 
How important is working 
with each of the following 
organizations in leading 
to the accomplishment of 
your organization's goals? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 4 5 
- Research Station 1 2 3 4 5 
- University 1 2 3 4 5 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 5 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- BAAC 1 2 3 4 5 
- Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
How important is working 
with each of the following 
organizations in leading 
to the fulfillment of your 
clients needs? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 4 5 
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- Research Station 1 2 3 4 5 
- University 1 2 3 4 5 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 5 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- BAAC 1 2 3 4 5 
- Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
How important is working 
with each of the following 
organizations in promoting 
the efficiency of the 
service delivery system? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 4 5 
- Research Station 1 2 3 4 5 
- University 1 2 3 4 5 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 5 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- BAAC 1 2 3 4 5 
- Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
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How important is working 
with each of the following 
organizations in developing 
your organization's 
overall planning effort? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
To no Li 
Extent Ex 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
tie Some Consider Great 
ent Extent -able Extent 
Extent 
To what extent does 
your organization 
have to compete with 
each of the following 
organizations in 
obtaining needed 
resources (e.g., 
funding, personnel)? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 4 5 
- Research Station 1 2 3 4 5 
- University 1 2 3 4 • 5 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 5 
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- Bangkok Bank 1 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
24. To what extent does 
each of the following 
organizations compete 
with your organization 
in providing services 
to clients? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Section III : How do you feel about other organizations? 
We would like to know your opinion about working with other 
organizations. I will read several statements and ask you to 
choose the number that is most representative of your opinion 
about each organization. 
189 
25. Organizations can conserve 
resources if they develop a 
joint effort. 1 
26. I personally am in favor of 
entering into joint efforts with 
other organizations in providing 
services to farmers. 1 
27. Working with other organizations 
can enhance administrative 
efficiencies in my organization. 1 
28. The overlap in extension service 
programs could be reduced if 
the involved organizations would 
work together. 1 
Definitely Not Definitely 
Should Certain Should 
Not 
29. To what extent do you think 
that each of the following 
organizations should become 
involved in a program 
designed to diffuse 
agricultural technology to 
the farmers? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 
- Research Station 1 2 3 
- University 1 2 3 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 
- Department of Commerce 1 2 3 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 
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Thai Farmer Bank 
BAAC 
Companies 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
Section IV; Cooperation among organizations has been 
emphasized by the government for many years. 
Even though efforts have been made to promote 
cooperation among organizations, conflicts may 
exist. From your experience in contacting each 
of the following organizations directly or 
indirectly, what is your observation about the 
relations with them? 
Very 
Little/ 
None 
Some Great 
Little Amount Much Deal 
30. In general, how much 
cooperation does your 
organization receive 
from each of the 
following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
31. To what extent is your 
organization in contact 
with each of the 
following organizations 
for the purpose of 
discussing issues of 
mutual concern? 
- Extension Office 1 
- Research Station 1 
- University 1 
- Cooperative 1 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 
- Retail Business 1 
- Bangkok Bank 1 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
32. To what extent does your 
organization refer clients 
to each of the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3- 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
33. To what extent does your 
organization seek advice/ 
assistance from each of 
the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
- Retail Business 
- Bangkok Bank 
- Thai Farmer Bank 
- BAAC 
- Companies 
34. To what extent does your 
organization invite each 
of the following 
organizations to attend 
meetings, seminars, or 
workshops? 
- Extension Office 
- Research Station 
- University 
- Cooperative 
- Dept. of Commerce 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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- Retail Business 1 
- Bangkok Bank 1 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
3 5. To what extent does your 
organization work jointly 
with each of the following 
organizations in planning 
and implementing programs 
or activities? 
- Extension Office 1 
- Research Station 1 
- University 1 
- Cooperative 1 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 
- Retail Business 1 
- Bangkok Bank 1 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 
- BAAC 1 
- Companies 1 
35. To what extent do disagreement 
or disputes characterize 
the relations between 
your organization and each 
of the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 1 
- Research Station 1 
- University • 1 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 5 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- BAAC 1 2 3 4 5 
- Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
To what extent do 
conflicts about areas of 
responsibilities 
characterize the 
relationship between your 
organization and each of 
the following 
organizations? 
- Extension Office 1 2 3 4 5 
- Research Station 1 2 3 4 5 
- University 1 2 3 4 5 
- Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 
- Dept. of Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 
- Retail Business 1 2 3 4 . 5 
- Bangkok Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- Thai Farmer Bank 1 2 3 4 5 
- BAAC 1 2 3 4 5 
- Companies 1 2 3 4 5 
If you had to select four of the following organizations 
to form a team to plan for rural development, which of 
them would you choose? 
- Extension Office 
Research Station 
University 
Cooperative 
Department of Commerce 
Retail Business 
Bangkok Bank 
Thai Farmer Bank 
BAAC 
Companies 
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Section Vt In this final section, we would like you to 
evaluate the progress of local farmers in terms of 
adopting agricultural technology. Your evaluation 
may be based on observations or experiences in 
providing services to the farmers. 
Very 
Little/ Some Great 
None Little Amount Much Deal 
39; To what extent are 
farmers progressive 
using new agricultural 
technologies? 1 
40. To what extent do you 
think the rate of 
adoption of new 
agricultural technologies 
among the farmers has 
increased? 1 
41. To what extent do you 
agree with the statement 
that cooperation among 
agricultural support 
organizations results in 
an increase in the number 
of farmers who adopt the 
new agricultural 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
technologies? 1 2 3 4 5 
42. To what extent do you 
agree with the statement 
that conflict among 
agricultural support 
organizations results in 
a decrease in the number 
of farmers who adopt new 
agricultural 
technologies? 1 2 3 4 5 
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43. What should these organizations do to stimulate farmers' 
adoption and increased use of new agricultural 
technologies? 
Thank you for your cooperation. If you would like to receive 
a summary of the results of this research project, please 
mark (X) in the box. 
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APPENDIX 3. COVARIANCE MATRICES 
Table A3.1. Covariance Matrix for Group 1. 
LOCDEP 1.932 
GOLS -.004 .321 
AWANESS -.032 .419 19. 445 
DOMCON .084 .019 
• 
273 .211 
GOLAC .324 .301 1. 999 .293 3. 235 
CLIS .324 .258 
• 
498 .275 2. 461 3. 176 
COMPT .072 .327 
• 
489 .034 
• 
342 
• 
273 
COMPET -.088 .240 1. 048 .042 
• 
767 
• 
607 
CONTACT .300 .422 2. 543 .474 1. 614 1. 414 
COOP .404 .268 3. 192 . 196 2. 124 2. 140 
CLCOOP .184 .233 
• 
895 -.003 
• 
403 
• 
339 
CONFLI -.036 .071 . 398 1
 o
 
• 
125 
• 
023 
CONFME .028 -.021 1. 185 .004 732 518 
532 
350 .955 
525 .766 2.307 
408 .752 1.772 
280 .194 .881 
108 . 348 . 221 
022 .442 .596 
VD 
vo 
3.180 
.616 .983 
.132 .069 .285 
.828 .222 .307 1.312 
Table A3.2. Covariance Matrix foc Group 2 
LOCDEP 4.903 
COLS -. 286 1.762 
AWANESS -.477 1. 655 12.189 
DOMCON .453 .018 -. 127 1.179 
GO LAC .215 .359 3.944 .196 5. 216 
CLIS .648 .424 2. 044 .471 2. 393 3.836 
COMPT — .066 1.001 1.092 .025 .201 .388 1.519 
COMPET . 230 1.817 2. 506 .007 .641 .930 1.625 3.485 
CONTACT .660 1. 125 2.676 .280 1.936 1.942 1.017 1.677 
COOP .398 .299 3. 268 .264 2.726 2. 157 .223 .810 
CLCOOP . 113 .752 1.717 .400 .903 1.312 .456 .872 
CONFLI -. 160 . 740 1.365 .033 .623 . 603 .654 1 .047 
CONFME .625 .278 .385 .097 .202 .682 .490 .939 
3.166 
1.736 3.514 
1,181 1.013 2.224 
.860 .383 .521 1.077 
.753 .576 .628 .424 1.894 
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APKENDIX 4. CORRELATION MATRICES 
Table A4.1. Correlation matrix for Group 1 organizations. 
COLS 1.000 
LOG DE P 005 1.000 
AWANESS . 168 -.005 1.000 
GO LAC . 295 . 130 . 252 1. 000 
CLIS .256 .131 .063 .768 1.000 
DOMCON .073 . 132 . 135 .356 . 336 1.000 
COMPT .791 '.071 .152 .261 . 210 .101 1.000 
COMPET .434 —. 065 .243 .436 .348 .093 .490 1.000 
CONTACT .490 .142 .380 .591 . 522 . 106 .474 . 516 1.000 
COOP .265 . 163 .406 . 662 . 673 .240 . 314 .431 .654 1.000 
CLCOOP .415 .134 . 205 . 226 . 192 -.008 .387 .201 .585 . 348 1.000 
CONFLI .233 -. 049 . 169 . 130 .024 -. 084 . 276 .667 . 272 . 139 . 130 1. 000 
CONFME 033 .018 . 235 .355 . 254 .008 .027 .395 .342 .405 .195 . 502 
Table A4.2. Correlation matrix for Group 2 organizations 
GOLS 1.000 
LOCDEP -.097 1.000 
AWANESS .:357 -.062 1.000 
GOLAC .118 .042 .495 1.000 
CLIS .163 .149 .299 .535 1.000 
DOMCON .013 .181 
COMPT .612 -.02' 
COMPET .733 .05! 
CONTA .476 .16( 
COOP .120 .09( 
CLCOOP .380 .03' 
CONFLI .537 -.07( 
CONPME . 152 .20! 
.034 .079 . 221 1.000 
.254 .071 . 161 .019 1.000 
,385 . 150 .254 .004 .706 1.000 
,431 .476 .557 . 145 .464 .505 1.000 
.499 .637 .588 . 130 .096 .231 .524 1.000 
,330 .265 .449 .247 .248 .313 .445 .362 1.000 
,377 .263 .297 .029 .511 .541 .466 . 197 .337 1.000 
,080 .064 . 253 .065 .289 .366 .307 .223 .306 .297 
